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INTRODUCTION

This Article will survey trends in the United States and Canadian
tort systems and discuss how they have impacted American and Canadian liability insurance markets. A major thesis of this Article is
that the changing complexion of the United States tort system, paralleled by similar trends in Canada, explains many of the recent
problems in availability, affordability and adequacy of liability insurance. Changes in parameters of liability and quantum of damage
have made it increasingly difficult for insurers to price various types
of risks. In particular, this Article argues that attempts to pursue
deterrence objectives and compensation (social insurance) objectives
simultaneously through a single legal instrument - the tort system
entail unresolvable contradictions that have destabilized the system and its associated private insurance arrangements, especially
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with the increasingly widespread espousal of a social insurance objective for the tort system. It further argues that the tort system is
incapable of coherently serving this latter objective, and that the
adoption of de facto or de jure regimes of strict liability premised on
social insurance (or risk spreading) rationales yields no clear or stable legal equilibrium and has contributed significantly to the current
liability insurance crisis. The Article also argues that deterrence or
accident-reduction rationales for strict liability generate equally indeterminate outcomes.
The problems of forecasting how courts will resolve the social insurance-deterrence dilemma and how they will identify superior risk
bearers or risk spreaders for social insurance purposes are particularly acute with "long-tail" risks. These are risks for which an insurer's exposure may extend perhaps two decades or more beyond
the time when the risk being insured against occurs, and perhaps
long after the insurance policy at issue has expired. 1 Long-tail risks
are not the only problem that insurance markets have difficulty accommodating. Other difficulties will be canvassed in the course of
this Article, but long-tail risks represent the most extreme form of
uncertainty for insurers in underwriting and pricing risks. Long-tail
risks involve substantial technical uncertainties, for example, the
likelihood of toxic substances discharging from given storage facilities over time, as well as substantial medical or scientific uncertainties, such as what the form and incidence of health problems are
likely to be from given levels of exposure over time. Substantial
"socio-legal" uncertainty also exists as to what the legal ground rules
are likely to be twenty or thirty years hence in allocating liability for
these risks and quantifying losses associated with them.
This last risk is particularly problematic for insurers because it is
largely undiversifiable through conventional insurance procedures of
pooling similar but uncorrelated or independent risks. Socio-legal
risk affects all lines of general liability insurance; all risks are to an
important extent dependent on similar socio-legal factors. In this respect, socio-legal risk constitutes a form of "systematic" rather than
"unsystematic" risk, which always poses substantial problems of insurability. While this risk might in theory be diversified away
through the stock market rather than the insurance market, Winter
has shown that where there is a positive net opportunity cost to raisI. Prominent examples include: toxic torts such as those involving asbestos, in
which the plaintiff's illness or death may follow a latency period of 20 to 30 years from
the time of exposure; discharges of toxic chemicals from waste disposal dumps which
may contaminate local water or atmospheric conditions after similar latency periods;
medical malpractice claims in which birth defects may not fully manifest themselves for
many years after birth; other professional negligence claims, such as those against architects or engineers, in which safety defects in structures may not manifest themselves in
the form of injuries until many years after the completion of the structures.
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ing additional equity, this diversification route is incomplete.2 Where
severe uncertainty attends insurers' estimation of the probability distribution associated with a given risk and the magnitude of the losses
which may accompany the risk, this uncertainty will immediately
manifest itself in the repricing of insurance, in restrictions on coverage (higher deductibles, more co-insurance, lower coverage ceilings,
exclusions of certain risks, the substitution of claims-made for occurrence-based coverage), and, at the limit, in the complete withdrawal
of coverage. This Article points to a number of doctrinal innovations
in American and to a lesser extent Canadian tort law that substantially increase insurers' uncertainty in predicting both determination
of liability and quantification of damages in particular cases. To the
extent that this socio-legal risk cannot be assigned a reasonably reliable, actuarially-based, probability distribution, the distinction emphasized many years ago by Frank Knight 3 between risk and uncertainty becomes central to an analysis of the current liability
insurance crisis. The thrust of the analysis in this Article is thus very
much in the spirit of Knight's distinction between -risk and
uncertainty.
A major question that this Article attempts to answer is why Canadian liability insurance markets in the last several years have developed many of the same surface characteristics as United States
markets in terms of the availability, affordability and adequacy of
liability insurance. Many formal features of the Canadian tort system differ sharply from those of the American tort system, often in
respects which many United States commentators view as major
sources of infirmity
in their system. To list a number of the major
4
differences:
1. Canadian tort cases typically are determined by judge alone and not by
juries;
2. the contingent fee system for financing plaintiffs' legal costs, which arguably leads both to more speculative actions and inflation of awards by
juries sensitive to the net value of awards to plaintiffs, is not widely utilized
anywhere in Canada and is prohibited in Ontario;
3. the British cost rule applies in Canada, whereby the loser in a civil suit
must compensate the winner for a high proportion of the latter's legal costs,
again arguably discouraging speculative suits (this contrasts with the American cost rule whereby each side bears its own costs);
2. R. WINTER, "CRISES" IN COMPETITIVE INSURANCE MARKETS (Working Papers in Economics E-86-74, Hoover Institution, Stanford Univ. Dec. 1986).
3. F. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 197-263 (1921).
4. See J.R.S. Prichard, A Systematic Approach to Comparative Law: The Effect
of Cost, Fee and Financing Rules on the Development of the Substantive Law (unpublished manuscript on file with the author, 1985).

4. awards for pain and suffering, which are a major component of United
States personal injury awards, are subject to a relatively modest judiciallyimposed cap of less than $200,000 in Canada;
5. discount rates employed to convert foregone future income streams to
present value terms for purposes of a lump sum award apparently are subject to wide variations in judicial practice in the United States, but at least
in Ontario follow a rate standardized by a formal Rule of Court;
6. punitive damages, which can constitute a significant component of damage awards in the United States, are very rarely granted by Canadian
courts;
7. the movement from negligence to strict liability in the products liability
context in the United States, which has expanded the parameters of liability
of manufacturers, has not occurred in most Canadian provinces, including
Ontario;
8. United States workers' compensation laws in most cases permit employees to sue third parties (such as manufacturers of defective products) in tort
despite their workers' compensation entitlements (many products liability
actions in the United States arise in this way, for example, the asbestos
litigation), whereas in Ontario most third party actions are legally foreclosed and the employee is confined to his workers' compensation benefits;
9. the rules governing aggregation of individual claims as class actions as
entailed in the United States in mass toxic tort claims, such as the asbestos,
DES, and Agent Orange litigation, are much more permissive than in Canada where in all provinces, other than Quebec, class actions are subject to
severe legal constraints;
10. the U.S. Supreme Court does not hear appeals on matters of purely
state law, which includes most aspects of tort law, thus leaving open the
potential for substantial diversity of doctrine among the fifty states (and
consequent uncertainty for insurers of firms operating in a number of state
markets), whereas the Supreme Court of Canada is the ultimate adjudicator of all legal issues, including those of a private law nature, subject of
course to the ability of provincial legislatures (not courts) to adopt distinctive legal rules within their own jurisdictions;
11. social security programs in Canada are in many cases more generous
and comprehensive than in the United States (for example, universal health
care insurance), and thus there is a reduced need to look to the tort system
to serve a social insurance function.

Explaining why Canada, or at least Ontario, appears to have undergone a liability insurance crisis with surface similarities to that in
the United States, despite these differences between the two tort social security systems, may entail one of several approaches: (i) the
explanation for the liability insurance crisis may lie outside the tort
system; (ii) despite the formal and functional differences between the
two tort systems, the functional similarities may be greater than they
appear at first sight; (iii) it is plausible to predict that the formal
and functional differences will narrow increasingly in the future and
that the insurance industry is weighing this risk heavily, particularly
in the case of long-tail risks where socio-legal uncertainty presents a
significant non-diversifiable form of risk; or (iv) despite the surface
similarities in the insurance crisis, the crisis actually may have been
less severe in Canada, reflecting the impact of the existing and predicted future differences between the two tort systems.
This Article argues that all four kinds of explanations have some
force but that the last three seem to be the most cogent. The third,
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non-diversifiable socio-legal risk, is perhaps the most problematic for
current policy makers. In some sense it entails doing nothing and
providing credible commitments to private economic agents that
nothing will be done in the future to increase significantly socio-legal
risk.
Part II of this Article sketches some of the dimensions of the liability insurance crisis in the United States and Canada. Part III sets
out and evaluates various explanations that have been offered for the
crisis. Part IV reviews statistical evidence of increases in the cost of
the tort system in the United States and Canada. Parts V and VI
identify and evaluate doctrinal shifts in the United States and Canadian tort systems to which the increasing costs of the systems have
been attributed. Finally, Part VII reviews and evaluates various criticisms of the current tort systems.
These critiques operate at different levels. Some are directed at
the general presuppositions of tort law as an instrument for achieving both deterrent and compensatory goals. Some are directed at detailed features of existing doctrine that, if remedied, are claimed to
be capable of ameliorating at least the most seriously dysfunctional
aspects of the present system. Others (typically flowing out of the
first strand of criticism) argue for radical displacement of the current tort system by either more stringent forms of regulation of
safety hazards or state-run or state-orchestrated forms of administered compensation for accidents and illnesses.
THE DIMENSIONS OF THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS

The United States
A recent report by the Tort Policy Working Group, an interagency working group. consisting of representatives at ten agencies
and the White House, appointed by the U.S. Attorney General, provides illuminating data on problems of availability, affordability and
adequacy of liability insurance for various classes of insurers.'
Municipalities have faced premium increases of as much as four
hundred percent. Increases of one hundred and two hundred percent
have been common, often for policies with lower coverage and higher
5. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON
THE CAUSES, EXTENT AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INSURANCE
AVAILABILITY AND AFFORDABILITY (Feb. 1986) (see especially Chapter 1) [hereinafter
DOJ REPORT]. The data reported in this study are updated by the Tort Policy Working
Group in a subsequent study, AN UPDATE ON THE LIABILITY CRISIS (Mar. 1987) [hereinafter CRISIS UPDATE].

deductibles. Similar increases have been reported for insurance purchased for public officials. Some cities have decided to "go bare"
rather than pay these increases. As a consequence, public services
such as playground, swimming, and sporting activities have been
substantially curtailed in an effort to minimize risks.6 The implications of these increases in the price of coyerage and reductions in the
availability and scope of coverage have a variety of second-order effects, many seemingly perverse, that extend beyond the class of insureds in question.7
Smaller firms, local bodies, and day care centers often are the
most severely affected because their other insurance requirements do
not provide a sufficiently substantial package to attract coverage for
higher risk lines. In this respect, insurance availability and cost may
well create a significant barrier to entry for new small firms without
established reputations, diversified product lines, and substantial additional insurance requirements (fire, property, auto, group employee
policies). In the longer term, this barrier to entry may impair consumer welfare by reducing the range of goods and services available,
6. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 9. The Tort Policy Working Group also notes
that a recent survey of daycare centers found that 40% of respondents had their insurance canceled, and those with coverage faced premium increases of 200% to 300%. Similar problems have been reported by public transit operators; newspaper and magazine
publishers (with respect to libel insurance); nurse-midwives (whose group insurance was
canceled and who had severe difficulty in obtaining other coverage); architects and engineers (engineers in toxic substances abatement have faced premium increases of up to
5000% where insurance has been available at all); toy manufacturers; household appliance manufacturers; automobile repair shops and garages; medical equipment manufacturers; biotechnology companies; oil and gas drilling contractors; construction contractors; natural gas transportation companies; general manufacturing; machine tool
manufacturing; battery recycling and smelting companies; power equipment manufacturers; general aviation manufacturers (liability insurance has risen from an average of
$211 per plane for business, commuter and private aircraft delivered in 1972, to $70,000
per plane in 1985); ski field operators; aerospace equipment manufacturers; bus and
trucking companies; directors' and officers' liability insurance; bank fidelity bond coverage; liquor retailers; obstetricians/gynecologists, pediatricians and dentists (who have
faced sharp increases in premiums and reductions in coverage often by as much as 50%);
environmental impairment liability insurance for gradual pollution exposures (47 companies were forced to close hazardous waste management facilities in 1985 for lack of coverage after two major insurers dropped out of the market, leaving only two companies
still writing this class of risk); sudden and accidental pollution coverage (now routinely
excluded from most general liability insurance policities. Id. at 6-13.
7. For example, general medical practitioners commonly refuse to handle
pregnancies and deliveries; doctors, general and specialist, insist on all manner of additional tests and opinions ("defensive medicine") in order to forestall liability claims; community service programs have been curtailed; waste disposal sites closed or transferred to
small, undercapitalized and perhaps less sophisticated firms which are prepared to run
the risk of "going bare" and going bankrupt in the event of claims; small, new, specialized biotechnology firms which cannot obtain coverage are forced to forego promising
research. Larger pharmaceutical companies have abandoned research on new vaccines as
too risky; individuals are more reluctant to become directors or officers of companies or
local bodies when adequate insurance cannot be purchased for them. CRIsIs UPDATE,
supra note 5, at 11-20.
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retarding innovation rates, and facilitating supra-competitive pricing
by larger firms that remain in these markets.
Canada

Evidence presented to the Ontario Task Force on Insurance
(Slater Task Force) 8 suggests similar patterns of insurance problems
in Ontario. A survey of members of the Canadian Manufacturers'
Association indicated that nearly half of the respondents experienced
a doubling of their liability insurance premiums and reductions in
coverage for 1986. Increases of 600% to 800% have not been uncommon. Exporters of products to the U.S. have encountered difficulty in
obtaining product liability insurance at any price. Day care centers,
truckers, municipalities, school boards, firms in the hospitality and
tourism industries, taverns, and directors and officers of corporations
all have reported major problems in the pricing and availability of
insurance. Bus and transit operators have reported substantial premium increases, in some cases ranging from 1000% to 2000%, often
for reduced coverage. Various classes of professionals, for example,
architects and engineers, have reported massive premium increases.
Volunteer and charitable organizations, sports and recreational
groups have reported substantial premium increases; for sports and
recreational groups the increases have been between 150% and
900%. Hospitals faced a 362% increase in the basic cost of liability
insurance in 1985-86, and only two major insurers remain in this
market.9
In order to establish more systematically than the above data permit the extent of the similarities and differences between the United
States and Canadian insurance crises, it would be important to compare current levels of premiums in both countries for given categories of risk to ascertain (1) whether recent increases in Canada have
been as great as those in the United States; and (2) whether the
increases, even if similar, have been applied to a lower pre-crisis
level of premiums in Canada than in the United States; and thus,
whether resulting premiums reflect some significant differential in
the assessment of liability exposure in Canada compared to the
United States. Simply observing that there have been dramatic increases in liability insurance premiums generally in both countries is
insufficient to develop informed insights on the central question of
8.

MINISTRY OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS, ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE
SLATER TASK FORCE REPORT].

(1986) [hereinafter

9. Id.

31-35

whether the insurance and reinsurance markets now treat various insured activities in Canada and the United States as presenting similar liability exposure, despite the formal differences in the two tort
systems. Data noted later in this Article suggest that base levels of
general liability insurance premiums per capita have been considerably lower in Canada than the United States, and that rates of increase have been much less severe in the former than the latter, but
this data is fragmentary and requires detailed corroboration.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF THE LIABILITY INSURANCE CRISIS

A variety of explanations have been offered from various quarters
for the liability insurance crisis. These are reviewed briefly and evaluated as a prelude to developing a sharper focus on the changing
complexion of the United States and Canadian tort systems.
Conspiracy
A crude explanation of the current crisis, sometimes offered by the
plaintiffs' bar and others, is that insurance companies are conspiring
to raise premiums to excessive levels to exploit purchasers of insurance or to panic legislatures or courts into depriving victims of their
proper dues.
While property and casualty insurers (like many other industries)
are not beyond fixing prices to avoid competition, 0 it seems highly
implausible that concerted activity explains the present phenomenon.
In the United States, the property and casualty insurance industry
apparently comprises over 900 companies and possesses a relatively
atomistic market structure, with relative ease of entry. Twenty insurance groups account for fifty-three percent of written premiums, indicating a relatively unconcentrated and workably competitive industry."' The structure of the Canadian industry is similar.12 There
appears to be no evidence either in the United States or Canada that
purchasers of insurance are being confronted by a unified phalanx of
insurers all demanding a common price for their insurance. More10. See, e.g., Aetna Insurance Co. v. The Queen, I S.C.R. 731 (Can. 1977) (involving Aetna and 72 other corporations).
11. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 28.
12. In 1984, 243 companies offered general liability insurance (compared to 226
in 1978). The four firm concentration ratio was 18.7 in 1984 (compared to 17.3 in 1955).
The sixteen firm concentration ratio was 50.7 in 1984 (compared to 42.1 in 1955). F.
MATHEWSON & R. WINTER, REPORT TO THE ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE, THE

MARKET FOR PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE IN ONTARIO Table 4 (1986). Eighty
percent of Canadian manufacturing industries are more concentrated than the Canadian
general liability industry. In Ontario in 1984, 109 companies wrote general liability insurance. Thirty-two of these reported direct written premiums in excess of $2.5 million.
INS. BUREAU OF CANADA, BRIEF TO THE ONTARIO TASK FORCE ON INSURANCE (1986)
[hereinafter INS. BUREAU OF CANADA].
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over, proponents of the cartel theory seem unable to point to recent
circumstances that have made cartelization of the industry easier
now than in the past or to reasons why the tendency apparently has
been confined to liability insurance and is not evident in property
insurance, which typically is sold by the same insurers. The difficulties of sustaining a cartel over as many firms, as many risk classes,
and as large a geographic area as entailed in the present liability
insurance crisis seem formidable. In addition, the profit-maximizing
strategy for cartel members would require raising prices to monopoly
levels, while continuing to provide customers with the service demanded. Monopoly profits cannot be made by withdrawing service.
On the contrary, in most market sectors some insurers have refused
to renew coverage and have withdrawn from the market. Others
have remained and demanded substantial premium increases and/or
coverage restrictions. Still others have managed to offer terms which,
while less attractive than those previously offered, are superior to
those of competitors. This general scenario is not suggestive of
tightly concerted action by all former competitors.' 3
This is not to deny that in some sub-segments of the liability insurance market, for example, the hospital or toxic waste markets, the
state of competition may be a matter of concern. Economies of scale
and specialization seem to imply significant barriers to entry for new
insurance providers. In these cases, avoiding regulatory policies that
increase entry barriers beyond what they inherently are would seem
an important objective. More general proposals by the Slater Task
Force for raising initial capitalization requirements for property and
casualty insurers and rendering more stringent ongoing liquidity ratios in the interests of "stabilizing" the industry, 4 seem misconceived if sharpening the competitive discipline throughout this industry is considered desirable. Finally, it should be noted that, unlike
the United States industry, the insurance industry in Canada is subject to antitrust laws, yet the Canadian enforcement authorities apparently have not seen in the present liability insurance crisis any
evidence that would seem to warrant enforcement action. 15

YALE

13. See generally Priest, The CurrentInsurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96
L.J. 1521, 1527-29 & nn.39-45 (1987); CRISIS UPDATE, supra note 5, appendix at

1-10.
14. See SLATER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 107-08, 128-29.
15. For a discussion of the government's role in regulating Canadian issuers, see
SLATER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 101-34.

The Influence of Foreign-OwnedInsurance Companies in the
CanadianMarket
A related argument is that the presence of foreign-owned (principally United States) companies in the Canadian property and casualty insurance industry suggests that they are acting in concert to
recoup large underwriting losses in the United States by forcing Canadian purchasers of insurance to cross-subsidize United States
activities.
The Canadian industry, however, is comprised of a significant percentage of non-American owned firms. Nineteen out of the biggest
thirty-two general liability insurers in Ontario in 1984 were not
American-controlled and seven were Canadian-owned. 18 Entry seems
relatively easy, and attempts at supra-competitive pricing by U.S.owned companies in the Canadian market would be likely to draw a
rapid competitive response. Moreover, both this and the previous rationale do not explain why these types of market manipulations have
only manifested themselves in the recent past. If these strategies
were feasible, why did profit-maximizing firms in the industry fail to
exploit Canadian consumers by such means much sooner?
"Imprudent" Prior Premium Pricing
Another explanation of the current crisis is that in the late 1970s
and early 1980s insurance companies were attracted by high yields
on investments at a time of record-high interest rates, and engaged
in excessive competition with each other for the consumer's premium
dollar in order to increase cash flow and capitalize on investment
opportunities. With falling interest rates in the last several years,
premiums have been increased to generate an acceptable overall rate
of return.
This explanation presents several odd features. First, in stark contrast to the previous two explanations of the current crisis, it is premised on excessive competition in the industry rather than successful
concerted attempts to stifle competition through price fixing or market division. These explanations are difficult to advance simultaneously. Second, while it may be true that premium levels have been
increased to reflect reductions in investment income, it is not clear
that this implies anything inappropriate about either present or past
premium pricing policies. One implication of the argument appears
to be that since 1982, instead of falling in real terms, premiums
should have been adjusted gradually upwards, rather than adjusted
precipitously as has happened in the last year and a half. However,
this seems a curious view - insurance companies, at a time of sub16. See

INS. BUREAU OF CANADA,

supra note 12.
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stantial returns on their investments, also should have been charging
substantially higher premiums. But this surely would have led to
charges of gouging - that the public was being charged premiums
that failed to reflect the substantial increases in insurers' other
sources of income. The behavior of insurers both when interest rates
were high and, more recently, since they have fallen, seems readily
consistent with profit-maximizing, competitive behavior.
Unstable government macroeconomic policies probably should be
viewed as the prime culprit for the hardships sustained by insurance
buyers as a result of the volatility in premium levels reflecting the
more general volatility in interest rates. Moreover, while falling interest rates may have generated rising premium levels in the insurance context, they have generated positive benefits for businesses and
consumers in many other contexts. To the extent that the liability
insurance crisis is, in part, a product of rapidly changing relationships between premium and investment income (as seems clearly in
part the case), it should be viewed in the larger context of the impact of falling interest rates on the economy. Moreover, assuming
that present interest rates are expected to remain reasonably stable,
the recent adjustments in premium levels would seem to be a shortrun transition that does not imply continuing increases in premiums
in the future.
However, whether the current liability insurance crisis can be in
any way seriously attributed to falling investment income can be
doubted on several scores. First, other lines of insurance, such as
property and life insurance, for which the relationship between premium and investment income is similarly important, have not exhibited most of the symptoms of the liability insurance crisis, which in
turn suggests that the explanation must lie in factors sui generis to
this sector. Second, a need to raise premium levels to offset reductions in investment income would lead, of course, to premium increases (although not obviously on the scale that have occurred in
many cases), but would not lead to insurance coverage being withdrawn or drastically reduced, deductibles being drastically raised, or
certain defined classes of risks being excluded from more general
policies that previously covered them. Third, it is not entirely clear
why higher nominal interest rates, and hence, investment income,
should lead to lower premiums if nominal interest rates are accurate
forecasts of future inflationary trends, including the various cost
components of future insurance claims. Only variations in long-term
real interest rates (of which some evidence exists) would seem likely,

under competitive conditions, to have any impact on premium levels.
This impact is likely to be relatively small, but may be greatest with
temporally distant claims (long-tail risks).
Recoupment of Past Underwriting Losses
An extension of the previous argument is that not only have insurance companies sought to rectify past underpricing of premiums but
that, in addition, they are attempting to recoup past underwriting
losses - losses perhaps exacerbated by a spate of unfortunate tragedies in the recent past, such as several major airline crashes, the
Bhopal disaster, the Mexican earthquake, and the asbestos tragedy.
This argument is not especially compelling. These losses are sunk
costs. Assuming that the industry is reasonably competitive, any attempt by firms which have sustained these past underwriting losses,
whether the result of a string of nonrecurring bad luck or not, to
recoup them by raising current premiums above levels that current
risks would justify would seem likely to induce various competitive
responses from insurers which have not sustained these past losses,
from new entrants, or from insureds who would find it profitable to
form their own risk pools or captive insurance companies or to selfinsure.
The Reinsurance Market Cannot Distinguish The Canadianand
U.S. Risk Markets
Another frequently made argument is that the reinsurance market
confuses the Canadian and American risk markets. This argument
also is not plausible. It assumes gross information failures in what
has hitherto been regarded as a relatively sophisticated industry. The
reinsurance market has, for example, been able to distinguish certain
states in the United States, in which courts or legislatures have been
disposed to adopt liability regimes that are especially generous to
plaintiffs. Reinsurance providers have refused to reinsure risks from
these states or have charged differential premia. Moreover, it is not
clear why developing an appreciation of the differential exposure entailed for insurers under the Canadian tort system compared to the
American system presents substantially more complex informational
challenges than developing an appreciation of the higher risks entailed by oil tankers operating in the Persian Gulf compared to, for
example, those operating in Alaska. Data noted later in this Article
appear to contradict this "confusion" explanation of the Canadian
liability insurance crisis.
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Unscrupulous/UnderemployedLawyers
While the plaintiffs' bar points to the insurance industry as the
villains in the present crisis, some elements in the insurance industry
adopt the counter-tactic of alleging that unscrupulous or underemployed lawyers are the major villains, who dredge up highly speculative suits and induce their clients to demand highly inflated awards.
This argument seems as crude and implausible as the countervailing conspiracy theory. Above all, it fails to explain the timing of
the current crisis. If lawyers are predisposed to act unscrupulously in
tort claims, why have they waited until so recently to indulge this
apparently highly rewarding penchant? Moreover, why have courts
only recently become such easy marks for trumped-up claims and
grossly inflated awards?
A partial counter to this response is that lawyers have proliferated
greatly in numbers over recent years and are now in gross over-supply. In order to find gainful employment, they are increasingly compelled to seek out new avenues of endeavor and thus turn to fo1
menting contrived claims. 7
While the number of lawyers has increased more rapidly than the
general population in the United States and Canada, the number of
lawyers in the United States increased by a factor of 2.9 between
1950 and 1984. This growth factor was less than that of many other
occupations, and roughly equivalent to the growth in real Gross National Product (G.N.P.) during this period.18 While Canada experienced a substantial increase in the number of lawyers in the late
1950s and 1960s, the net increase in practicing lawyers in recent
years has been about four percent per year, and is estimated at three
percent per year for the foreseeable future, below prevailing increases in real G.N.P. and below the rates of increase of many other
occupations. 19 While the recent recession has made it more difficult
for young lawyers to establish themselves in the profession, no evidence has been adduced, either in the United States or Canada,
which indicates that these new entrants have been responsible for
any significant portion of the additional insurance claims.
17. See D. GILL, LIABILITY INSURANCE: CRISIS IN SUPPLY 26-29 (1987).
18. Stager, Are There Too Many Lawyers?, 9 CAN. PUB. POL 245 (1983); R.
Sturgis, The Cost of the U.S. Tort System: An Address to the American Insurance Association (Nov. 1985).
19. R. Sturgis, supra note 18; see also Pashigian, The Market For Lawyers: The
Determinants of the Demandfor and Supply of Lawyers, 20 J. L. & EcON. 53 (1977).

The Changing Contours of the Tort System
A final argument is that the tort system, especially in the United
States, has been undergoing a rapid transformation in which the parameters of liability have been extended dramatically and the quantum of awards have been increased equally dramatically. Some observers point to similar, albeit weaker trends in Canada. The next
section of this Article attempts to document statistically these trends
in both tort systems. To the extent that the trends prove to be more
pronounced in the United States than in Canada, we must try to
explain why the surface dimensions of the liability insurance crisis
seem as severe in Canada.
As the next section shows, the United States tort system indeed
has been undergoing a dramatic transformation. This transformation
seems to lie at the center of any plausible explanation of the current
liability insurance crisis. The only other explanation of any cogency
reviewed in this section is the changing relationship between premium and investment income. However, the heart of the explanation
seems to lie in the changing contours of tort law, to which we now
turn.
STATISTICAL TRENDS IN THE U.S. AND CANADIAN TORT SYSTEMS

The United States
Revenue and Loss Experience
The DOJ Report provides the following data on trends in the
United States tort system:
1. Underwritinglosses for 1981-85: The property and casualty insurance industry reported annual statutory underwriting losses after
policyholders dividends of approximately $6, $10, $13, $21, and $25
billion. 20 For commercial multiple peril policies, annual underwriting
losses for this period were $0.5, $1.2, $1.7, $2.9, $3.0 billion.2 1 For
commercial general liability insurance, annual underwriting losses
for the period were $1, $1.7, $2.1, $3.2, and $4.6 billion. 22 For medical malpractice liability insurance, annual underwriting losses for the
period were $0.5, $0.7, $0.8, $1, and $1.4 billion.23
2. Profit and return: General commercial liability and medical
malpractice insurance accounted for only seven percent of written
premiums of all property and casualty lines in 1984. Taking account
of investment income, the property and casualty insurance industry
recorded a net profit of $7.6 billion in 1985 (the $25.2 billion under20.
21.
22.
23.

DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 17.
Id. at 19-20.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
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writing loss was offset by $32.8 billion in investment and other income).2 From 1975-1984, the property-casualty insurance industry
produced an annual rate of return on net income of 10.9%.25 In 1984
the property-casualty insurance industry produced an annual rate of
return of 1.8%, compared to the median return rate for Fortune 500
companies of 13.6%.26 In 1986, the property-casualty insurance industry's profitability substantially improved - the 1986 rate of return was roughly equivalent to its ten year average and was slightly
less than the ten year rate of return for Fortune 500 industrial corporations. Property/casualty stocks generally outperformed the stock
market from January 1984 to January 1986, but trailed the market's
performance during 1986.27
Again, it bears noting that liability insurance constitutes a very
small part of the book of business written by the industry. With respect to so-called crisis lines, a recent study by the United States
Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice reports sharp recent
increases in the variability of loss incurred and loss adjustment ratios
for insurers, and thus concomitant increases in uncertainty of exposure in these lines.2" Prior to 1984, commercial line premiums had
declined in constant dollar terms for five consecutive years. Premiums in 1984, while higher, were still twenty percent less than premiums collected in 1978, despite record-high pay-outs.2 9
The data noted above describe broad relationships between revenue and loss experience. Breaking down loss experience to pinpoint
sources of increased loss experience, statistics indicate both a dramatic increase in the size of awards and an equally dramatic increase in the incidence of certain classes of tort suits.
3. Size of awards: The average medical malpractice jury verdict
increased 363%, from $220,018 in 1975 to $1,017,716 in 1985. Malpractice claim severity over the decade 1975-84 has risen twice as
fast as the Consumer Price Index.3 0 Average product liability jury
verdicts increased during the same period 370%, from $393,580 to
$1,850,452. These increases greatly outpaced the rate of inflation one dollar in 1985 had approximately half the buying power of one
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
Evidence,

Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 18-19.
supra note 5, at 23-24.
Id., appendix at 19-22.
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 22.
Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New
49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57 (1986) [hereinafter Danzon, New Evidence].
CRISIS UPDATE,

943

dollar in 1975. There has been a marked increase in very large
awards: in 1975 there were three million-dollar or greater medical
malpractice verdicts and nine million-dollar product liability verdicts. In 1984, there were seventy-one and eighty-six such awards
respectively. 31 Pain and suffering damages seem to comprise a high
portion of these large awards. For example, non-economic damages
account for approximately twenty-seven percent of the total amount
of medical malpractice awards of between $100,000 and $200,000.
Noneconomic damages account for fifty-four percent of the total
amount of awards over $600,000.32 The average Cook County, Illinois, punitive damage award in personal injury cases increased from
$40,000 in 1970-74 to $1,152,174 in 1980-84 (1984 dollars). 33 Average jury verdicts in wrongful death cases involving adult males increased from $223,259 in 1975 to $946,140 in 1985, a 324% increase. 34 Danzon reports estimated annual growth rates in average
incurred cost per claim for the period 1971-78 as follows: physicians
and surgeons 12.1%; hospitals 18.9%; product liability bodily injury
19.4%; automobile bodily injury 14.1%. 35 The DOJ Report notes
that one jury verdict reporting service found that the average jury
verdict in personal injury lawsuits had increased by approximately
twenty-five percent or more in three separate years; 24.5% in 1980,
30.49% in 1981, and 27.54% in 1983.36
The Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice recently conducted a study of trends in jury awards in Cook County, Illinois and
San Francisco, California from 1960 to 1984. 37 The study showed
that during this period, using inflation-adjusted dollars, the average
jury malpractice award increased 2,167%, from $52,000 to
$1,179,000, in Cook County and 830%, from $125,000 to
$1,162,000, in San Francisco. The comparable increase in average
jury product liability awards was 212%, from $265,000 to $828,000,
in Cook County and 1,016%, from $99,000 to $1,105,000, in San
Francisco. The increase in "expected jury awards" - the average
jury award multiplied by the plaintiff's likelihood of success - has
been even more dramatic. From 1960 to 1984, the expected jury
malpractice award increased by 4,254%, from $13,000 to $566,000,
in Cook County and 1,172%, from $34,000 to $616,000, in San
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
Id. at 47-49.
CRISIS UPDATE, supra note 5, at 47.
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 47-49.
Danzon, Tort Reform and The Role of Government in Private Insurance
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517, 519 n.6 (1984).
DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 47-49.
M. PETERSON, CIVIL JURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS IN JURY TRIALS AND VERDIC'TS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS (Rand Corp. Inst. for Civ. Just.
1987).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
Markets,
36.
37.
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Francisco. The comparable increase in expected jury product liability awards was 445%, from $76,000 to $414,000, in Cook County
and 927%, from $56,000 to $575,000, in San Francisco. Average
jury award data and expected jury award data both show that most
of the increase in jury verdicts from 1960 to 1984 occurred during
the period 1980-84. In many categories, the increase in awards from
1980-84 was double or triple the entire increase in awards from 1960
to 1980. Substantial increases in inflation-adjusted million-dollar
jury awards are also reported. Million-dollar awards accounted for
85% of the total damages awarded by Cook County juries in 1980 to
1984, compared to 4% in 1960-64, and 58% of the total damages
awarded by San Francisco juries during the same period, compared
to 14% in 1960-64. As the data on increases in expected awards imply, plaintiffs have steadily increased the percentage of cases in
which they prevail before juries. In product liability cases in Cook
County and in malpractice cases in both Cook County and San
Francisco, plaintiffs have roughly doubled the percentage of tried
cases in which they prevail before juries, from approximately one
quarter of such cases in 1960-64 to one half in 1980-84.11 Another
study has found that in cases involving severely injured plaintiffs,
corporate defendants were required to pay over four times the
amount paid by individual defendants in similar cases and that corporate defendants were more likely to be found liable than individual
defendants.3 9
Incidence of Tort Lawsuits
With respect to the incidence of lawsuits, the number of product
liability cases filed in federal district courts has increased from 1,579
in 1974 to 13,554 in 1985, a 758% increase. Cases filed against physician-owned companies have increased from 10,568 in 1979 to
23,545 in 1983, a 123% increase in four years.4 ° The number of
medical malpractice suits per 100 physicians doubled between 1979
and 1983 and tripled during this period for obstetricians/gynecologists.4 A recently published American Medical Association study
reports that, on average, claims per 100 physicians increased from
38.
39.

Id. at 17, 22, 26, 33.
A. CHIN & M. PETERSON,

41.

Id. at 47.

DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN
COOK COUNTY JURY TRIALS 42-43 (Rand Corp. Inst. for CiV. Just. 1985).
40. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 45.

3.2 in 1980 to 10.1 in 1985.2 Over the decade 1975-84, a major
U.S. medical insurer reports an average annual growth rate of claim
frequency per physician of ten percent.43 Claims against municipal
and county officials increased 141% between 1979 and 1983. Tort
claims against municipalities also have increased dramatically; for
example, New York City experienced a 375% increase from 1979 4to
1983 in the number of personal injury claims brought against it. 4
The transaction costs associated with this proliferation in tort litigation are extremely high. A recent study by the Institute of Civil
Justice estimated that for all tort cases, the net compensation paid to
plaintiffs amounted to only forty-six percent of the total 1985 expenditures for tort litigation.4 5
These assorted data on the dramatic escalation in the size and incidence of claims should make it clear beyond doubt that the liability insurance crisis is not a contrivance of the insurance industry but,
in large part, is a result of an explosion both in the parameters and
quantum of liability in the United States tort system. The size of the
transaction costs incurred in dispensing compensation under the system raises further questions as to whether victims, despite expansions of liability and increases in awards, are really as much beneficiaries of the system as their agents - the lawyers.
Canada
Canada has experienced somewhat similar trends in the frequency
and severity of claims met out of various forms of liability insurance.
Industry figures indicate that the loss ratio for liability insurance
was 78.2% in 1978, 68.9% in 1979, 58.1% in 1980, 71.7% in 1981,
86.5% in 1982, 100.4% in 1983, and 108% in 1984. For the period
1979 to September 1985, underwriting losses for the property-casualty business as a whole totalled $4.25 billion, and investment income totalled almost $4 billion, leaving losses on insurance operations of about $275 million. Nominal return on equity was 6.99% in
1984 and real return on equity was 2.64% for the year.46
Data made available to the author by one of Canada's major general liability insurers and displayed in Appendices A and B trace
42.

AMERICAN MEDICAL ASS'N, THE CONTINUING NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE RE-

FORM OF THE MEDICAL LIABILITY SYSTEM

7 (1987).

43. Danzon, New Evidence, supra note 30, at 63.
44. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 42. That there has been a general explosion in
tort suits in state courts is challenged by the NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
STATE COURT CASELOAD

STATISTICS: ANNUAL

REPORT,

1984 (1986). The National

Center's findings are strongly criticized by the Tort Policy Working Group in CRISIS
UPDATE, supra note 5, at 42-44.
45. J. KAKOL & N. PACE, COSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION
70 (Rand Corp. Inst. for Civ. Just. 1986).
46. See INS. BUREAU OF CANADA, supra note 12.
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trends over the last decade in numbers of large loss settlements for
general liability bodily injury, and gross loss payments by age of
closing, indicating in the first case a rapid increase in the number of
large claims and in the second high average annual increases in size
of settlements.
Professor Samuel Rea recently has calculated4 7 the damages in a
well-known decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1978, Andrews v. Grand and Toy Alberta Limited.4" Professor Rea estimates,
in the light of subsequent legislative and judicial modifications in the
method of calculating damages in personal injury cases, that the
1978 award of $896,147 would be equivalent to $3,731,871 in 1986
- an increase of 316% during a period when prices increased 84%.49
The increase can be explained largely by changes in judicial methods
of calculating costs of future care in permanent disability cases.
While this study's primary focus is third party liability insurance
rather than auto insurance, trends in the auto insurance context are
of some interest. In a recent paper, Harry J. Saunders, Chairman of
the Insurance Bureau of Canada, notes:
The automobile accident rate in this province [Ontario] has declined by
13.5% since 1981, but the frequency of bodily injury claims has increased
by 21.3%. That's a 40% swing in the space of four years - and the average
cost per claim has risen by 54% in that period. That's a devastating combination which translates into an increase of bodily injury costs per insured
car of 87% in four years."

Appendices C - G display data from the Canadian Medical Protective Association, a professional liability insurance association to
which over eighty-five percent of all doctors in Canada belong. The
data show dramatically rising trends in premiums, average awards
and settlements, total damages awarded against physicians, defense
costs, and writs served against doctors. 1 Another recent analysis
shows that since 1977, there has been an average annual increase in
writs served per doctor of 10.2% and average annual increases in
claim severity of 12.8%.52
47. S. Rea, Economic Perspectives on the Liability Insurance Crisis, Special Lecture for the Law Society of Upper Canada (Mar. 6, 1987) (text on file with the author).
48. 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can. 1978).
49. See S. Rea, supra note 47.
50. H. Saunders, Back to Basics: The Search for Restraint in Tort (paper
presented to the Conference on Law and Contemporary Affairs, Univ. of Toronto Law
School, Jan. 16, 1987).
51. Sellers, The Potential Effect of Liability Claims on the Canadian Public
Health System, in SLATER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 355-63h.
52. Stergiou, Medical Malpractice Coverage: A Growing Crisis in Canada, CANADIAN INS. AGENT & BROKER

(June 1984).

THE CHANGING FACE OF AMERICAN TORT LAW

Within the constraints of a single article, only a superficial survey
of major currents in American tort law that appear to be contributing factors to present problems affecting the availability, affordability, and adequacy of liability insurance is possible. United
States tort law falls primarily within the individual jurisdictional domains of each of the fifty states, with limited appellate jurisdiction
exercised by the United States Supreme Court. As a result, a survey
of American tort law must grapple with often highly fluid doctrine
within a given jurisdiction as well as substantial variations across
jurisdictions. The account that follows necessarily involves high
levels of generalization intended to do no more than identify the
most problematic features of recent legal developments. These developments might be conceived of as bearing either on determinations
of liability or on quantifications of liability. Importantly, what unifies
these developments, in the present context, is the increase in uncertainty each generates for insurers attempting to price risks.
Determinationsof Tort Liability
The Expanding Reach of Negligence Principles
A major misconception of non-United States legal scholars (and
perhaps also some United States legal scholars) is that the increase
in tort litigation is primarily attributable to the movement from negligence to strict liability in recent years, especially in the products
liability context. But as a prominent United States torts scholar,
Professor Gary Schwartz, has persuasively argued, the so-called "explosion" of tort liability in the United States in the past quartercentury has been quite explicitly an explosion of negligence liability,
rather than a substantial extension of the spheres of application of
strict liability.53 Many of the sectors in the United States in which
problems of insurability recently have emerged as most acute ostensibly are governed by negligence principles. 4 However, in a broad
range of settings, the distinction between negligence-based liability
53. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and The Ethics of Strict Liability, 15
GA. L. REV. 963 (1981).
54. These sectors comprise all suppliers of services, including, for example, physicians and other professionals, day care centers, municipalities, ski-field operators, and
bus and truck operators. The extension of liability to psychiatrists who fail to warn third
parties of patients' dangerous propensities; to tavern or restaurant proprietors or social
hosts who fail to prevent patrons or guests leaving their premises too intoxicated to drive
safely; to proprietors of nursing homes or day care centers for abuse of patients or children by staff members; to municipalities for abuse of authority, excessive force or failure
to act by police officers or for recreational accidents occurring in the course of activities
organized under their aegis; to physicians for "bad babies"; and to accountants for improperly executed audits, all represent extensions of liability to particular acts or omissions through the application of negligence principles.
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and strict liability is more formal than functional. "Fault" is not a

self-defining term. Under strict (as opposed to absolute) liability, at
least in a products context, plaintiffs still are required to prove a
"defect," again not a self-defining term. A number of the United
States products liability cases first recognizing liability for failing to
design a crashworthy car or liability for other design defects, liability
for foreseeable consumer misuse, or liability for failure to provide an
adequate warning of safety hazards associated with an otherwise
sound product, were explicitly decided on negligence principles.

argued, 56

5

It

that many of the
may well be, as Priest has eloquently
same intellectual presuppositions that have driven the movement to
strict liability also have motivated the expansion of the realm of negligence. Such presuppositions include assumptions of manufacturers'
market power; assumptions of consumer ignorance or powerlessness;
assumptions about the virtues of internalizing to suppliers of goods
or services the social costs attendant on their use; and assumptions
about the superior risk bearing or risk spreading capabilities of suppliers relative to consumers.
Danzon has found that in the case of medical malpractice, abolition of the locality rule, which provides that local standards of practice determine negligence, abolition of charitable immunity, restrictions on the scope of the informed consent defense, and expansion of
the scope of respondeat superior by various states prior to 1970 accounted for a high percentage of increased claim frequency, increased severity of claims and higher total claims costs over the period 1975-1978.7 In other words, shifts in doctrine within the
negligence regime, perhaps in response to similar forces driving the
movement to strict products liability, yielded similar impacts. Without seeking to sustain the extreme claim that formal adoption of
strict liability over negligence makes no significant difference to liability determinations in any context (indeed the opposite is argued
below), proposals to reform United States tort law by reinstating
negligence regimes where they have been formally displaced by strict
liability are unlikely to eliminate substantial uncertainty regarding
assignment of liability, without further efforts to define with some
precision the determinants of standards of care and remoteness that
55. See, e.g., Noel, Manufacturers' Negligence of Design or Directionfor Use of
a Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
56. Priest, The Invention of EnterpriseLiability: A CriticalHistory of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1985).
57. P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLicy 76-77 (1985) [hereinafter P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].

set the bounds of a negligence regime.

Strict Liability
In the early 1960s, courts expanded manufacturers' strict liability
from such areas as food and drugs to all products. Priest argues that
this expansion was driven by the presuppositions noted above and
has posed major conceptual problems of locating strict liability on
the continuum between negligence and absolute liability. 8 While
fault need not be proved, courts have refused to accept that every
negative interaction with a product (for example, tripping over a
chair or cutting oneself with a kitchen knife) creates liability, which
would, in that event, be absolute. Attempts to maintain an uneasy
equilibrium betweeni fault-based liability and absolute liability have
revolved around the concept of "defect." Defects have been categorized in three ways: construction defects, design defects, and warning

defects. 59 The first category

-

construction defects

-

in most con-

texts poses few difficulties: a particular product is defective if, relative to other units of the same product, it has been made in such a
way that the divergence occasions injury to a user.60 The early
1960s' landmark strict liability cases typically involved this scenario
(for example, exploding soda bottles) and represented relatively
modest extensions of negligence principles in contexts where res ipsa
loquitur and concepts of merchantability and fitness had often produced the same results.6 1
The second category

-

design defects

-

has proved much more

problematic. Here the victim argues that all units of a particular
type of product possess dangerous features.6 2 Such issues could be,
and indeed were, litigated under negligence principles. Victims
sometimes succeeded when they could show, for example, that the
58. Priest, supra note 56, at 505-33. For a review of many of these problems, see
A. Schwartz, Products Liability Law (Law and Economics Workshop, University of Toronto, Dec. 10, 1986) (copy on file with the author).
59. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 695-99 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
60. Id. at 695; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959);
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 (1965).
61. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436
(1944); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1962); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960);
Kassab v. Central Soya, 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968); Franklin Serum Co. v. Hoover & Son, 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967); Kroger Co. v. Bowman, 411 S.W.2d 339 (Ky.
1967); Vallis v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 190 Cal. App. 2d 35, 11 Cal. Rptr. 823
(1961).

62. See

PROSSER

& KEETON, supra note 59, at 688-89, 698; see also Barker v.

Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Greenman v.
Yuba Power Prod., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 398 (1965).
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installation of a guard on a power lawnmower at small cost would
reduce foreseeable accidents, or when automobiles, which were perfectly sound in moving from A to B, were found uncrashworthy. In
such cases, however, the perspective of the adjudicator under negligence principles was essentially an ex ante perspective. The question
was: what should a defendant reasonably have done by way of product modification, given the risks associated with a product's use that
were known or reasonably discoverable by defendant at the time of
the product's sale, and given the costs of product modifications?
While neither regulatory nor industry standards were conclusive on
this question, 3 proof that a given design followed widely practiced
norms is some indication that defendant was not at fault. 64 Moreover, there was little room for debate that the usual defenses to a
negligence action, such as voluntary assumption of risk or contributory or comparative negligence, applied to the design defect context
if the victim's own actions significantly contributed to the occurrence
of the accident.
The advent of strict liability altered the definition of "design defect" in significant ways. A widely employed judicial definition requires plaintiff to prove either (a) that the product failed to perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner; or (b) that the product's
design proximately caused plaintiff's injury and defendant fails to
prove, in the light of the relevant factors, that the benefits of the
challenged design outweigh the risks of danger inherent in such design. 5 In the latter situation, relevant factors include the gravity of
the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such
danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative
design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequence to the product and the consumer that would result from an
alternative design. The first test is sometimes referred to as the "rea63. See, e.g., Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257 (10th Cir. 1978); Johnson
v. Husky Ind., Inc., 536 F.2d 645 (6th Cir. 1976); Elsasser v. American Motors Corp.,
81 Mich. App. 379, 265 N.W.2d 339 (1978); Forrest City Mach.Works, Inc. v.
Aderhold, 273 Ark. 33, 616 S.W.2d 720 (1981); Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash.
2d 208, 683 P.2d 1097 (1984); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 414 Mich. 413, 326
N.W.2d 372 (1982); Blueflame Gas, Inc. v. Van Hoose, 679 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1984).
64. See, e.g., Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 77 III. 2d 434, 396 N.E.2d
534 (1979); Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 93 I11.
2d 299, 443 N.E.2d 575 (1982);
Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 225 Pa. Super. 349, 311 A.2d 140 (1973); McDaniel v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 196 Neb. 190, 241 N.W.2d 822 (1976).
65. See PROSSER & KETON, supra note 59, at 698-700; see also Barker, 20 Cal.
3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 455-56.

sonable expectations" test, the second an ex post "risk-utility" test.60
Serious uncertainties surround both tests. The reasonable expectations test is, to some extent, a tautology. What consumers will expect
of a product will, in part, be a function of the qualities a court deter-

mines it should have exhibited. 7 Moreover, by imposing liability for
hazards that arise not only in intended uses but in other reasonably
foreseeable uses, liability for foreseeable misuse (already recognized
in some negligence-based cases) seemed to be confirmed while leaving highly uncertain the scope of defences such as volenti and contributory or comparative negligence.
Switching from an ex ante to an ex post perspective has raised a
number of difficulties. Is only after-the-fact knowledge of safety
hazards to be imported into the decision, or are after-the-fact developments in product design also to be considered? If the latter, will
this create perverse incentives for manufacturers to suppress safety
innovations for fear of incurring retrospective liability for previously
sold products?68 More generally, by imposing ex post liability for
what may have been ex ante unknowable risks in the interest of requiring improved product design in the future, now that the full
costs and benefits of the challenged design and alternatives to it can
be assessed, the courts simultaneously have imposed retrospective liability for risks69 that neither manufacturers nor insurers were likely
to have been able to predict or price accurately at the time the product was produced. The judicial justification for this approach is that
this relieves the courts of the task of determining what was previously feasible or not feasible and casts this burden on the party with
the superior ability to make this judgment. 0 This justification in no
way mitigates the pricing and insurability problems associated with
what often may be unknowable risks. The problem is particularly
acute with long-tail risks such as those associated with vaccines or
drugs such as DES, where serious health hazards may only materialize after a substantial time lapse, and where safer medical substitutes may have emerged in the interim. Insurers who may have covered this class of risk at the time of the product's sale may face
uncertain exposure almost indefinitely.
Moreover, it is far from clear whether the courts have any special
competence to discharge the implicit prospective public standard-set66. See Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978), and comments thereon in Schwartz, Foreword: UnderstandingProducts Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435 (1979).
67. See Calabresi & Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL
STUD.

585, 585-86 (1985).

68. Id. at 624.
69. Id. at 613.
70. See id.; see also Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 432, 573 P.2d at 456.
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ting role which they have assumed.7 1 For example, the Maryland
Court of Appeals recently held that handguns are defective, not because they do not achieve their intended purpose, but because they

do so too well, generating substantial costs for victims of crime for
which manufacturers and retailers should be strictly liable.7 2 It must
be acknowledged that even under negligence principles, the Learned
Hand test of negligence, which requires that possible precaution
costs be weighed against expected accident costs, requires the courts
to adopt a cost-benefit mode of analysis to define appropriate stan-

dards of performance. 3 In the design defect context and perhaps
others, such as medical malpractice, courts may not be especially
well-equipped to perform this function.

The third category of product defect is warning defects. Issues re-

garding warning defects typically have arisen in cases in which a
product may present special risks to certain sub-groups of users with

unusual characteristics, 74 for example, consumers with toxic or allergic reactions, 75 or to users of a product in especially risky settings,
for example, using highly flammable substances near a flame.76 In
these contexts, the question of the adequacy of a warning presents

issues similar to those that have arisen under negligence regimes, at
least in cases where the manufacturer knew or reasonably should
have known of the special hazards involved. Under both regimes,
court decisions have been extraordinarily divergent in the standards
that they have applied to warnings. 77 This uncertainty is readily ex71. See Brown, Comment on Calabresiand Klevorick's "FourTests for Liability
in Torts," 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 629 (1985).
72. Kelley v. R.G. Industries Inc., 304 Md. 124, 497 A.2d 1143 (1985) (commented on in Note, Kelley v. R.G. Industries: Gun Control Fires Back, 21 TORT & INS.
L.J. 493 (1986)); see generally Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 1912 (1984).
73. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
74. See, e.g., Tomer v. American Home Prod. Corp., 368 A.2d 35 (Conn. 1976);
Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969); Robbins v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 499 P.2d 1080, 1086 (Kan. 1972); Erny v. Revlon, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 261 (Mo.
1970); Crocker v. Winthrop Laboratories, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965); PROSSER & KEETON,
supra note 59, at 685-89, 697-98.
75. See Panel Discussion, Medico-Legal Aspects of Allergies, 24 TENN. L. REV.
840-42 (1957); Whitemore, Allergies and Other Reactions Due to Drugs and Cosmetics,
19 Sw. L.J. 76 (1965); see also Ryes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th
Cir. 1974); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 Ohio St. 2d 192, 423 N.E.2d 831 (1981).
76. See, e.g., Jones v. Hittle Serv., Inc., 219 Kan. 627, 459 P.2d 1383 (1976);
Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 119 Ariz. 426, 581 P.2d 271 (1978); Ruggeri v. Minnesota
Min. & Mfg. Co., 63 111.App. 3d 525, 380 N.E.2d 445 (1978).
77. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 59, at 697-98, 685-89.

plained. Given that ex post a serious injury has been caused to the
plaintiff by a product, any warning attached to the product by definition was inadequate to avert the injury, and by a relatively easy slide
of logic, simply inadequate. 8 If the plaintiff had been more fully,
explicitly, or emphatically appraised of the product hazards, his or
her sense of self-preservation would have led to appropriate precautions. As to when a warning should trigger the defense of voluntary
assumption of risk, must the warning lay out a probability distribution of mishaps and a correlated severity of consequence schedule
associated with this probability distribution? Detailed information of
this kind, of course, entails such complexity that many warnings are
unlikely to be read or fully comprehended. Conversely, more elliptical warnings risk being viewed by courts as insufficiently precise.
Moreover, because warnings are typically the cheapest precaution
open to a product manufacturer, a further slide of logic will readily
induce courts to hold that, given the seriousness of the safety consequences ex post, either attaching a warning where none existed or
attaching a more extensive warning where a less extensive one existed is the least that might be expected of a manufacturer and is
clearly cost-justified. 79
The general adoption of strict products liability in the United
States has added a further dimension of complexity to the issue of
warning defects. In Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corporation,8" the New Jersey Supreme Court held manufacturers of asbestos liable to asbestos workers, even on the factual assumption that
the health hazards associated with asbestos in low exposure settings
were neither known nor knowable at the time exposure occurred.
The court rejected a "state of the art" defense and held that a product is defective (1) if with the benefit of hindsight, the risks it
presents exceeds its utility, or (2) when the health risks are less than
the product's social utility, if the risks, with the benefit of hindsight,
could have been reduced still further by appropriate warnings.8" In
Beshada, the court held that the product was defective, at least in
this second sense, in part justifying its decision on the risk spreading
properties of strict liability.82 Characterized by critical commentators as requiring warnings of the unknowable in order for manufacturers to avoid liability, and thus as teetering on the brink of abso78. Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 67, at 605.
79. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings
in Products Liability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REV.
495 (1976); Sales, Duty to Warn and Instructfor Safe Use in Strict Tort Liability, 13
ST. MARY'S L.J. 521 (1982).
80. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
81. Beshada, 90 N.J. at 202, 447 A.2d at 545.
82. See id. at 202, 205, 447 A.2d at 545, 547.
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lute liability, the decision has proven highly controversial.8 3 The
same court recently has refused to extend its holding to a drug that
subsequently exhibited a side effect that was previously unknown
and unknowable, suggesting that special features distinguished the
asbestos case. 4 Thus, considerable legal uncertainty now exists
about when product liability for health hazards will be imposed because of failure to warn.
Apart from strict products liability, the United States
"Superfund" legislation passed by Congress in 198085 now also imposes strict liability on generators of toxic wastes which are contributed to waste storage sites, and on operators of the sites for site
cleanup costs if dangers of discharge exist. As a matter of common
law doctrine, there may well be strict liability on the part of these
parties to injured third parties in the event discharge occurs, under
the law of nuisance or the doctrine in Rylands v. Fletcher6 (or modern variations thereof). For the most part, however, the events that
trigger liability, either under Superfund or at common law, are reasonably well defined, although the consequences may not be. Uncertainties tend to relate to other issues, particularly that of joint and
several liability (discussed below).
More generally, the major conceptual difficulty with strict liability, justified in social insurance terms, is that superior risk-spreading
ability is what triggers liability. However, the internal structure of
the superior risk spreader rationale for liability makes it unclear
whether either the presence of fault or a defect is logically required
to ground liability. On risk-spreading rationales, why shouldn't a
person who trips over a kitchen chair or cuts himself on a carving
knife be able to sue the manufacturer? At this point, strict liability
collapses into absolute liability, with an arbitrary designation of an
insurer as the liable party. Indeed, why not allow the victim to sue
anyone who ostensibly is a superior risk bearer to him or to the
chairmaker, for example, the latter's banker, law firm, accounting
83. See, e.g., Note, Products Liability - Strict Liability in Tort - State of the
Art Defense Inapplicable in Design Defect Cases, 13 SETON HALL L. REV. 625 (1983);
Comment, Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.: Adding Uncertainty to Injury, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 982, 1008-15 (1983); see also Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97
N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
84. Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 468 A.2d 374 (1983); see Rabin, Indeterminate Risk and Tort Reform: Comment on Calabresi and Klevorick, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 633, 635 (1985).

85. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. § 9601 (1986).
86. L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868).

firm, securities underwriter, timber supplier, trucking operator, or indeed a large, well-endowed, well-insured, or well-diversified enterprise totally unconnected to either party?
At the limit, it is not clear why, if the courts are committed to
spreading accident costs as thinly as possible, there is any logical
stopping point short of rendering the state liable for all accident
costs (whether or not this is an efficient form of insurance in other
respects). Even short of this stopping point, the courts in pursuing a
superior risk bearer inquiry would seem required to give primacy to
whether one party is insured or not; or, if neither party is insured,
whether one is better diversified than the other; or, if neither is welldiversified, but the adjudicator believes in the declining marginal
utility of money and that interpersonal utility comparisons are possible (that is, that a given loss reduces the utility of a rich person less
than a poor person), 87 the relative wealth of the parties. By long historical tradition in common law civil disputes, the courts are supposed to sedulously eschew these considerations. To now make these
considerations determinative of liability would cast them in a radically new role.
This is not, of course, to suggest that the courts are pushing relentlessly toward state liability for all accident costs or that the
above considerations that may bear on relative private risk bearing
capacity systematically are pursued by the courts. In the products
liability context, the net of liability typically has not been cast more
widely than the product manufacturer. In addition, social insurance
considerations bearing on liability have been tempered by some concern with deterrence or corrective justice rationales for liability by
insisting on at least the semblance of a "defect." However, this still
leaves a substantial domain of uncertainty - it may be difficult for
courts to convince insurers that the liability net will not be extended
in the future. Even within the present liability net, it is not clear that
there is any principled basis for reconciling social insurance and deterrence rationales for liability and therefore what weight courts will
attach to each rationale in case-by-case adjudications.
Defenses
With the generalized adoption of strict liability in the products
context, United States courts have had not only to wrestle with the
meaning of product "defect", but also have been mired in considerable confusion about the scope of manufacturer defenses to strict Iia87. See G. Calabresi, The New Economic Analysis of Law: Scholarship, Sophistry, or Self-Indulgence? (Proceedings of the British Academy, Maccabaean Lecture in
Jurisprudence, London, May 14, 1981).
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bility claims.88 The American Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A recognizes voluntary assumption of risk as a complete defense,
but does not recognize contributory or comparative negligence as either full or partial defenses. 89 Various state courts and legislatures
have espoused different positions - some have recognized contributory negligence as a complete defense, 90 more have recognized comparative negligence as a partial defense calling for apportionment, 9
and some have viewed voluntary assumption of risk as merely a form
of comparative negligence calling for apportionment but not a complete bar to recovery.9 2 Some of the difficulty surrounding these
questions relates to whether it is conceptually appropriate to apportion liability under comparative negligence when this may seem to
entail comparing incommensurables - the degree of fault on one
side with strict liability on the other. Whatever the force of this conceptual difficulty, a majority of states in recent years appears to have
converged around comparative rather than contributory negligence
as a defense to strict liability actions.9"
Even more divergence exists concerning whether voluntary assumption of risk is merely an aspect of comparative negligence or an
independent and complete defense. At least until recently, considera88. See Rogerson & Trebilcock, Products Liability and the Allergic Consumer:
A Study in the Problems of Framingan Efficient Liability Regime, 36 U. TORONTO L.J.
52, 78-82 (1986).
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
90. See Reda Pump Co. v. Finck, 713 S.W.2d 818 (Ky. 1986); Waegli v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 197 Neb. 824, 251 N.W.2d 370 (1977); Butaud v. Suburban Marine
& Sporting Goods, Inc., 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975).
91. See, e.g., Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093
(D. Mont. 1981); Pan-Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Const. & Design Co., 565 F.2d
1129 (9th Cir. 1977).
92. See, e.g., Daley v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
93. See Trust Corp. of Montana v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 506 F. Supp. 1093 (D.
Mont. 1981); Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975); Sun
Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 211 F. Supp. 598 (D. Idaho 1976); Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976); Daly v. General Motors
Corp., 20 Cal. 2d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); West v. Caterpillar
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Busch v. Busch Const. Inc., 262 N.W.2d 377
(Minn. 1977); Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978);
Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979); Baccelleri v. Hyster Co., 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351 (1978); Hamilton v. Motor Coach Ind., Inc.,
569 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. 1978); Berry v. Coleman Sys. Co., 23 Wash. App. 622, 596 P.2d
1365 (1979); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967); Mulherin v.
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 628 P.2d 1301 (Utah 1981); Fiske v. MacGregor, 464 A.2d 719
(R.I. 1983); Kaneko v. Hilo Coast Processing, 654 P.2d 343 (Haw. 1982); Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166 (La. 1985).

ble uncertainty has surrounded these questions and even now the apportionment of liability is a rather arbitrary and unpredictable exercise. Part of the conceptual difficulty lies in whether social insurance
or deterrence objectives should motivate the nature of the defenses.
If the former, one might attempt to replicate the sort of deductible
and co-insurance provisions observed in voluntary, first-party insurance. If the latter, more extensive defenses might be required in order to create optimal incentives for efficient victim precautions, even
though such defenses may leave the victim with sub-optimal
insurance.
Causation
Causation issues have generated considerable uncertainty in a
wide range of emerging areas of tort liability. These problems have
been particularly acute in the cumulative trauma-toxic tort cases,
other product liability cases, and environmental discharge cases.
For example, in asbestos litigation,94 workers who have contracted
asbestosis, mesothelioma, or cancer had been exposed to different
sources of asbestos over large stretches of their working lives, often
in different work settings. Given latency periods often as long as
twenty to thirty years, identifying the particular source of asbestos
which precipitated the worker's illness or death is impossible. Apart
from this problem, other uncertainties are introduced: extraneous
circumstances, for example, smoking, may have caused the plaintiff's
condition or at least made him more susceptible to the health impacts of asbestos. Courts in different jurisdictions have adopted different, albeit arbitrary, causation rules to trigger liability. These
have ranged from the first source of exposure, or the last source of
exposure rule, to a rule making all manufacturers of asbestos to
which the victim was or may have been exposed jointly and severally
liable, 95 in effect allowing the victim to choose his defendant (typically the deepest pocket or best insured).9
These uncertainties have parallels in the relationship between the
defendant and his insurers.97 In the case of standard occurrence-triggered comprehensive general liability insurance policies, where the
94. See, e.g., Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539
(1982); Hammond v. North Am. Asbestos Corp., 105 I11.App. 3d 1033, 435 N.E.2d 540
(1982); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
95. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
96. For analyses of these difficulties, see Smith & Cuzmanes, Insurance Protection - Product Liability, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 112 (1985); Comment, Insurance
Coverage of Asbestos Claims - Running for Cover or Coverage, 32 EIORY L.J. 901
(1983).
97. See K. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1986).
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defendant may have been insured with different insurers over time,
when does an injury "occur" so as to trigger liability under the policy? One theory espoused by some courts is that an injury occurs
when the victim was exposed to asbestos dust ("inhalation exposure").9" Another theory is that injury may occur during the latency
and development of the disease ("exposure in residence"). 9 Yet another theory is that injury does not occur until the disease has manifested itself.100 A final theory (the so-called "triple-trigger" theory)
views any of these three occurrences as triggering liability under an
occurrence-based liability insurance policy with the insured defendant either being free to select the insurer from whom he seeks to
obtain indemnification for any claim, or being required alternatively
to apportion liability according to whatever fraction of total exposure
time each insurer was at risk.'' Substantial and extremely complex
secondary litigation between insureds and their insurers has now
been spawned by the primary litigation between asbestos victims and
asbestos manufacturers. 02
Joint and Several Liability
In various tort contexts, the doctrine of joint and several liability
has been used to single out particular defendants to bear full liability
for all losses suffered by victims, even though the defendants held
liable were not the exclusive suppliers of the noxious products. This
issue also has been particularly problematic under the U.S.
Superfund legislation that imposes strict liability for cleanup on contributors to and operators of chemical waste storage sites. Even a
contributor of one barrel of chemical waste conceivably may be held
liable for the complete costs of cleanup if the harm or threatened
harm from discharge is viewed as indivisible among sources. While
98. See Comment, Asbestosis: Who Will Pay the Plaintiff?, 57 TUL. L. REV.
1491, 1506 (1983); see also Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations, Inc., 633 F.2d
814 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1109 (1981).
99. See Comment, supra note 96, at 922-27.
100. See Comment, supra note 98, at 1498-1506; see also Eagle-Pitcher Ind., Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 682 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1279
(1983).
101. Comment, supra note 98, at 1510-14; see also Keene Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N.
Am., 667 F.2d 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982).
102. For accounts of these insurance complexities, see Note, Products Liability
Insurance Coverage, 31 S.C.L. REV. 718 (1980); Comment, supra note 96; Mansfield,
Asbestos: The Cases and the Insurance Problem, 15 FORUM 860 (1980); Comment,
supra note 98; Smith & Cuzmanes, supra note 96, Pomerantz, Products Liability Insurance in the New Industrial Revolution, 1980 INs. L.J. 129; Note, Adjudicating Asbestos
Insurance Liability: Alternatives to Contract Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 739 (1984).

the particular defendant held jointly and severally liable may have a
right to claim apportionment from other contributors, apportioning
liability among perhaps hundreds of contributors poses enormous difficulties and uncertainties. Many of the contributors may have
ceased contributing waste to the site twenty or thirty years before
the action. Others since may have gone out of business or ceased to
be identifiable; yet others may have few assets and little insurance. 10 3
The wild-card nature of joint and several liability and the incentives it creates to sue deep pocket or well-insured defendants also
have created problems for municipalities and other local authorities.
For example, defectively designed or constructed playground equipment that causes injury may have been supplied many years before
the accident. If the municipality is found even slightly negligent in
failing to maintain or replace the equipment or supervise the play
area, it may find itself (or its insurers) bearing the full cost of the
award unless it is able to secure effective indemnification from the
equipment manufacturer. It should be noted that a similar rule applies in Ontario in the case of joint tortfeasors, but only in cases of
"fault or neglect," thus arguably excluding cases of strict liability. 104
Statutes of Limitation and Repose
Severe uncertainty has surrounded the application of statutes of
limitation and repose to many emerging areas of tort liability. In
many instances, limitation periods in tort actions are tolled by the
occurrence of the injury or damage for which relief is sought in the
action. 10 5 However, in the cumulative trauma-toxic tort cases, unlike
highway accidents, for example, the injury does not occur at a discrete moment in time. In the asbestos cases, it is not clear whether
the injury occurs when the asbestos fiber is implanted in the victim's
lungs (assumed to be initial exposure), when in retrospect it might
have begun to turn cancerous, when the symptoms of the illness first
were manifested to the victim, or when they were first discoverable,
even if not observed by the victim. In medical malpractice claims
involving birth defects from allegedly negligent prenatal care, when
103. For analyses of these difficulties, see Note, The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980: Is Joint and Several Liability
the Answer to Superfund?, 18 NEW ENG. L. REV. 109 (1982); Note, Joint and Several
Liability Under Superfund: The Plight of The Small Volume Hazardous Waste Contributor, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 1057 (1985); Note, Joint and Several Liability for Hazardous Waste Release under Superfund, 68 VA. L. REV. 1157 (1982); Note, Apportioning
Damages Among Multiple Strict Tort Liability and Negligence Defendants: A Proposed
System of Group Contribution, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 309 (1981).
104. See Ontario Negligence Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 296, § 2(1) (1970).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comments e, g (1965); see also
Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823, 826-28 (7th Cir. 1979); Bolick v. American
Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415, 417 (1982).
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the injury occurs is unclear, given that its full manifestations may
not be apparent until the child has reached adulthood and his or her
incapacities have been fully revealed. In the DES litigation, it is unclear when the injury to the female offspring of the DES mothers
occurs.

There is wide diversity among the legislation of various states and
court decisions on these issues. 10 6 For a manufacturer supplying
products in numerous markets (and his insurers), exposure to what
are typically long-tail risks may vary dramatically from state to
state, again substantially increasing uncertainty as to the extent of
liability exposure.
Successor Liability
In the corporate setting, the doctrine of successor liability applies
to asset acquisitions, but not to share acquisitions. 0 It is designed to
prevent a firm faced with substantial tort claims from liquidating its
assets and frustrating the claims. A purchaser of a corporation's assets assumes any liabilities or contingent liabilities that have been
generated by those assets.108 In most states the doctrine only applies
where the acquiring firm continues to produce the product line that
generated the liabilities when the assets were owned by the vendor.10 9 In theory, the transfer of tort liabilities will lead a purchaser
to discount the value of the assets and thus reduce the returns to the
vendor from any attempt to frustrate tort claims by liquidating the
assets. However, considerable legal uncertainty surrounds the parameters of the doctrine, particularly regarding the continuity of the
same or similar product lines requirement. In the case of long-tail
risks, purchasers of assets risk being exposed to claims remote in
time whose existence and extent are difficult to determine.110
106. For discussions, see McGovern, The Status of Statutes of Limitations and
Statutes of Repose in Products Liability Actions: Present and Future, 16 FORUM 416
(1981); Note, Date-of-Sale Statutes of Limitation; An Effective Means of Implementing
Change in Products Liability Law, 30 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 123 (1979); Condon, Product Liability - 1983, 40 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 127 (1985).
107. Phillips, Products Liability of Successor Corporations: A Corporate and
Commercial Law Perspective, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 249, 249 n.1 (1982-83).
108. Phillips, Product Line Continuity and Successor CorporationContinuity, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 906, 907 (1983).
109. Id. at 918.
110. For discussions, see Roe, Mergers, Acquisitions, and Tort: A Comment on
the Problem of Successor CorporationLiability, 70 VA. L. REV. 1559 (1984); Phillips,
supra note 108; Schwartz, Products Liability, Corporate Structure and Bankruptcy:
Toxic Substances and the Remote Risk Relationship, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 689, 715, 716

(1985).

Quantification of Damages
As statistics noted previously have made clear, the escalation in
average size of awards for bodily injury and wrongful death claims
over recent years in the United States substantially exceeds the general inflation rate. Explanations offered for such rates of increase
are, for the most part, unconvincing. One might argue that increases
in economic productivity generate higher incomes over time, which,
when foregone as a result of bodily injury or wrongful death, will be
reflected in increasing damage awards over time. However, increases
in productivity and income have not been nearly as great as the increase in damage awards. Indeed, increases in the productivity of
labor in the United States since the early 1970s rarely have been
lower and often are perceived as a major source of declining competitiveness in many sectors. Similarly, to the extent that damage
awards are designed to compensate for future expenditures and
therefore must account for expected inflation in these costs over
time, the recent rates of increase in awards have far outstripped current rates of inflation and anticipated rates of inflation as reflected in
current nominal interest rates. Indeed, current rates of inflation have
fallen sharply from those prevailing several years ago, as have nominal interest rates, reflecting expectations of lower levels of inflation
in the future. It also has been argued that rates of innovation in
medical science have been extremely high in postwar years (since the
discovery of antibiotics in the 1940s), and that therefore, the range
of medical interventions that are technically possible, albeit often extremely expensive, to alleviate the consequences of bodily injury has
broadened dramatically. While this argument may have some force,
medical innovations that have occurred in the last several years
which would account for substantial surges in the size of awards (as
opposed to a gradual upward trend over time) are difficult to
identify.
I do not have a robust explanation for this puzzle. Given the central damage-assessment role of juries. in the United States, an articulation of reasons for size of awards is not compelled and therefore
cannot readily be scrutinized. Perhaps analysis must resort to some
deep sociological theory of changing community attitudes to riskbearing, but what the nature of such a theory might be is beyond the
reach of this author."1 ' One line of inquiry perhaps worth pursuing is
whether the presuppositions that Priest has argued have underlain
the expansion of the parameters of liability are also driving increases
in the quantum of liability.11 2 Classical tort law and theory viewed
111. See Y. AHARONi, THE No-RISK SOCIETY (1981); see also K.
supra note 97, chs. 2 & 8.
112. See, e.g, Priest, supra note 13, at 1525.

ABRAHAM,
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rules governing determinations of liability and quantum as prior
premises which then would inform decisions of private economic
agents as to when it might or might not be appropriate to insure
against the allocation of risks implied by these rules. 13 However, in
modern tort law and theory, this sequence of social and private calculi on liability and insurance has been inverted: the existence of
insurance will, to a large extent, determine both the assignment of
liability and the quantification of damage. If one party to a lawsuit
is perceived as possessing superior insurance coverage or risk-bearing
potential, this will tend to dictate both a finding of liability and a
generous award of damages. After all, it is assumed that he will not
bear the full brunt of either but will diversify the risks away in various ways. In this respect, the tort system becomes predominantly a
form of social insurance for a wide range of societal risks. As will be
developed more fully below, however, unlike other forms of social
insurance with which we are familiar, such as workers' compensation, unemployment insurance, and social security disability benefits,
where participation by cost-bearers and beneficiaries is mandated by
law, the tort system does not compel the maintenance of the group
insurance features of these other social insurance schemes.114 Lowrisk consumers who do not wish to pay the high insurance premiums
implicit in the price of certain products or services may drop out of
these markets. Low-risk suppliers of goods or services who cannot
identify themselves as such to third-party insurers also may drop out
of these markets. High-risk suppliers who remain may find that consumers do not value the insurance they are required to provide with
their products or services (for example, high-risk vaccines, intrauterine birth control devices) sufficiently highly to make a tied sale
of product/service and insurance economically viable. And thirdparty insurers may not find it economically viable to carry risks
which cannot be accurately priced because of the very large variance
in their potential exposures. 115
Thus, the tort system as a form of social insurance cannot ensure
that all cost-bearers and beneficiaries remain within the group being
insured. At this point, any civil liability system that predicates both
liability and quantum on the prior existence or availability of private
insurance with respect to one of the parties is likely to become ran113.
681
114.
115.

STUD.

See Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14 J.

LEGAL

(1985).

See S.

REA, DISABILITY INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY

See Priest, supra note 13, at 1548-50.

35, 36 (1981).

dom and unprincipled because the key variable - who will insure
and to what extent - is not one controlled by the courts and will be
influenced heavily by the courts' determinations of liability and
quantification of damage. Thus, a radical indeterminacy is introduced into the system because the existence and availability of insurance cannot be taken as a prior given from which liability and quantum can be inferred. The causation will frequently, perhaps
typically, run the other way. But if this is so, determinations of liability and quantum logically must precede and be independent of decisions by private economic agents as to whether to insure and if so,
to what extent. The insurance to liability sequence is unable to sustain any obvious legal equilibrium.
With these comments in mind, the problematic aspects of quantifying damage in United States tort law can be briefly reviewed. Very
few of them reflect recent doctrinal innovations and thus, weakly explain the sharp increases in average damage awards in recent years.
In this respect, the general explanation of the implications of a
change in fundamental presuppositions of the tort system - from a
sequence of liability to insurance to the revised sequence of insurance to liability - is the best theory that can be posited at this
point.
Damages for Pain and Suffering
According to Priest, awards for pain and suffering and other nonpecuniary losses comprise an estimated average of 47.2% of tort
damages. The percentage tends to be higher in very large awards
involving serious injuries."' While I have no data at hand that
would permit a conclusion as to whether this component of tort
awards has increased more sharply in recent years than other award
components, this seems to be a widely-held impression. Whether accurate or not, the appropriateness of awarding substantial sums for
pain and suffering has been increasingly challenged in recent years,
especially in the law and economics literature. The argument is there
made that in contrast to the third-party liability insurance involved,
for example, in product liability and professional malpractice actions, one does not typically observe individuals buying first-party insurance coverage that extends to pain and suffering. The principal
reason for this is that if insurance is designed to equalize money income over alternative states of the world, foregoing income in some
time periods through the payment of premiums in order to secure an
equal income stream in other time periods in the event of an accident may not be utility-maximizing if the nature of the damage is
116.

Id. at 1553-60.
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such that it cannot be alleviated by money. 117 Thus, Priest points out
that one rarely observes parents taking out insurance on their children's lives, because while the loss of a child may be the source of
overwhelming grief, nothing money can do is likely to assuage that
grief.118
Apart from this utility maximization argument against pain and
suffering damages, it is also argued that moral hazard problems are
particularly severe in this context because of difficulties of external
verification of the extent of the losses.' 9 This may be a further reason why such coverage is not observed in first-party insurance contracts and constitutes a substantial source of uncertainty as to the
extent of exposure for third-party insurers.
Thus, from an insurance perspective, awards for pain and suffering seem to make little sense. On the other hand, from a deterrence
perspective, pain and suffering may entail very real losses for tort
victims. In principle, the tortfeasor should be confronted with these
costs if he and other prospective tortfeasors are to take fully into
account all the social costs of their actions and be influenced by the
legal system to avoid those actions that generate more social costs
than benefits. This suggests an intractable trade-off between the social insurance and deterrence objectives of the tort system.120 However, to the extent that the former perspective has dominated the
trend toward the adoption of explicit or implicit forms of strict liability, the case for pain and suffering damages awards is weakened.
Under the classical negligence system in which the dominant objective arguably is to deter socially inappropriate behavior, the case for
retaining pain and suffering damages is much stronger.
Collateral Sources
Collateral benefits that accrue to the victim of an accident typically are not deducted from tort damage awards.' 21 These may include various publicly provided benefits such as medical benefits, social security payments, and unemployment insurance benefits, as
117. See Zeckhauser, Coverage for Catastrophic Illness, 21 PUB. POL'Y 149
(1973); Cook & Graham, The Demand for Insurance and Protection: The Case of Irreplaceable Commodities, 91 Q.J. ECON. 143 (1977); Shavell, Theoretical Issues in Medical Malpractice, in THE ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (S. Rottenberg ed.
1978); Rea, Non-Pecuniary Loss and Breach of Contract, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1982).
118. Priest, supra note 13, at 1546-47.
119. Id.
120. S. REA, supra note 114, at 35, 36.
121. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 181-86 (1973).

well as privately contracted benefits such as the proceeds from life
insurance or disability policies. In many cases, obviously, this means
"double" recovery for the victim. Excessive awards are thus viewed
as a consequence.
However, like the rule regarding pain and suffering awards, this
rule has obtained historically, so that recent increases in the size of
average awards cannot readily be attributed to it. The case for abolition of the collateral source rule is that the tort system was not
designed to provide plaintiffs with "windfall" gains, but to compensate them for actual losses incurred. Requiring collateral benefits to
be deducted from tort awards is likely to reduce both the frequency
and the severity of claims. This in turn would reduce the costs of
insuring against the risk of such claims.122 As a result, pursuing
smaller claims that are adequately covered by collateral sources will
cease to be worthwhile for plaintiffs. Also, the size of awards in
larger claims will be reduced significantly. 123
Unfortunately, as with the case of pain and suffering, the issue is
not as straightforward if one shifts from the social insurance to ,the
deterrence perspective. Optimal deterrence of socially inappropriate
behavior can only be achieved by confronting prospective tortfeasors
with the full social costs of their potential wrongdoing. Requiring the
deduction of collateral benefits from tort awards and removal of any
right of subrogation in the source of the benefits would attenuate
incentives to act wrongfully. Moreover, such a rule is likely to have
second-order incentive effects on the victim's side of the equation.
For example, if in wrongful death actions the proceeds of life insurance policies are required to be deducted from tort awards, the victims are, in effect, paying to insure wrongdoers against the consequences of their wrongdoing. It would seem totally irrational for
potential victims to engage in this kind of altruism. One might well
predict that if the present collateral source rule were abolished and
collateral benefits were deducted automatically from tort awards
with no right of subrogation in the insurer, life insurance companies
would offer lower premium policies that excluded coverage in cases
of wrongful death. In such event, the new legal rule would have been
circumvented by contract. From the point of view of the victim and
his dependents, however, this may be a less satisfactory contract
than current life insurance policies which guarantee a fixed sum on
death. With the exclusion of coverage for wrongful death in reformulated life insurance policies, the victim's dependents bear the risks
of judicial misestimation of their damages or at least uncertainty in
122. See generally Danzon, New Evidence, supra note 30; P.
supra note 57.

MALPRACTICE,

123.

See generally Danzon, New Evidence, supra note 30.
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this respect, as well as legal enforcement costs, which ex hypothesi
they would prefer to avoid, as evident in their choice of fixed sum
insurance contracts rather than contracts of indemnity.
Punitive Damages
While punitive or exemplary damages have always been recoverable in United States tort law, traditionally something in the nature
or
of fraud or wanton recklessness or indifference to another's safety
12 As a
justified.
be
would
damages
such
before
welfare was required
result, punitive damages rarely were awarded. In the last decade,
however, punitive damage awards in products liability and other tort
contexts have become more common. Juries typically determine, as
in other aspects of liability and quantum determinations, whether
12 5
punitive damages should be awarded, and if so, in what amount.
Perhaps the most spectacular award of punitive damages in recent
years was an award of $125 million in 1978 against Ford Motor
Company for continuing to market the Ford Pinto when company
made it prone to exofficials knew that the location of the gas tank
26 The plaintiff, a young
collisions.1
rear-end
of
event
plosion in the
27
teenager, was gravely injured and burned in such a collision.1 Ford
acknowledged that it was aware of this risk; however, internal costbenefit analyses indicated that the costs of redesigning the gas tank
exceeded the injury costs to victims which would result from leaving
the tank as it was.1 28 The jury apparently considered that Ford had
deliberately condoned the accident that had occurred. The verdict
was reversed on appeal and punitive damages were reduced to $3.5
million. 29 Other cases have involved an award of $5 million in punitive damages against Honda for designing a "diminutive" car that it
A.H.
knew was not "crashworthy", 30 a $6.2 million award against
3 ' and an
shields,'
intra-uterine
Dalkon
of
Robins, the manufacturer
award against American Motors Corporation for failure to crash-test
124.

K.

REDDEN. PUNITIVE DAMAGES

§ 2.6 (1980).

125. Id. § 3.4(a).

126. Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 Cal. App. 3d 757, 174 Cal. Rptr. 348
(1981).
127. Id. at 771, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
128. Id. at 777, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 361-62.
129. Id. at 771-72, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
130. Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., 655 F.2d 650, 654-55 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g
denied, opinion modified, 670 F.2d 21 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 673 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.),

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
131.

Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., 684 P.2d 187 (Colo. 1984).

a Jeep for durability of its rollbar in a forward pitch-over. 132
The potential for the award of punitive damages poses two major
uncertainties. First, the standard which must be satisfied in order to
trigger an award has ceased to be certain. Second, the basis on
which such damages will be quantified is unclear. Other objections
relate to the windfall nature of the award to the plaintiff; whether
multiple punitive damage awards should be awarded for multiple
sales of defective products, or if not, whether the first to the courthouse door should be required to share the award with subsequent
litigants; and the lack of procedural safeguards comparable to those
of the criminal law if punishment is the chief rationale for such
13 3
awards.
Other uncertainties surround the application of general liability
insurance coverage to this contingency. Most state courts interpret
policies so as to exclude coverage for deliberate acts of wrongdoing,
such as arson. In the case of punitive damages, some states have
interpreted standard comprehensive general liability policies as including coverage for punitive damages; other states have held this to
be contrary to public policy. 134 Still others have attempted to distinguish punitive damages awarded in cases analogous to the arson example where insurance is not permitted, from other punitive damage
awards, where the behavior at issue is less egregious.' 30 There are
also uncertainties as to which jurisdiction determines the insurability
of punitive damages - the state where the policy was issued or the
state where the tort was committed. 36
Critics of punitive damages would (a) abolish them altogether; (b)
limit them to some set multiple of actual damages; (c) have all or
most of them remitted to the state; (d) have juries only determine
liability for punitive damages and have judges alone determine quan132. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568
(1981); see Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of
Defective Products, 49 U. CH. L. REV. 1 (1982); Sales, The Emergence of Punitive
Damages in Product Liability Cases, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351 (1983).
133. See Owen, supra note 132, at 52-59.
134. K. REDDEN, supra note 124, § 9.4; see also Levit, Punitive Damages: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 1980 INS. L.J. 257, 262-63. According to Professor Redden,
the leading cases on either side are Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir. 1962) (public policy prohibits insurance coverage for punitive
damages because the defendant gains a certain freedom of misconduct inconsistent with
the punishment aspect of punitive damages), and Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins.
Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 647, 383 S.W.2d 5 (1964) (the closing of the insurance market for
punitive damages would be the result of judicial speculation concerning the deterrence
value of such an action). The trend has been to follow the Lazenby rationale.
K. REDDEN,
supra note 124, § 9.4. See also Note, Insurancefor Punitive Damages: A Reevaluation,
28 HASTINGS LJ. 431 (1976).
135. K. REDDEN, supra note 124, § 9.5.
136. See Pomerantz, supra note 94; Hagner, Punitive Damages - Insurance and
Reinsurance, 47 INS. COUNS. J. 72 (1980).
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turn; and (e) define
more stringently the criteria which will justify
137
punitive damages.
Other critics argue that punitive damages have been awarded relatively infrequently by trial courts and often then have been overturned or reduced on appeal.13 8 Moreover, they argue that an economic justification exists for awarding punitive damages in cases of
manufacturers' fraudulent concealment from consumers of the dangers inherent in their products and in cases of reckless conduct. They
view both as forms of intentional torts where efficiently structured
incentives for revelation or less careless conduct require a multiple of
actual damages.139 Here again a tension exists between the social
insurance and deterrence objectives of the tort system. On insurance
grounds, punitive damages cannot be justified - victims would not
insure themselves for more than their losses. On deterrence grounds,
however, punitive damages might sometimes be required in order to
create appropriate incentives to deter socially undesirable behavior.
This tension is exacerbated when strict liability is the primary regime chosen to govern liability, for social insurance reasons, when
for deterrence reasons some other basis of liability is appropriate. To
require courts or juries to keep insurance and deterrence objectives
rigorously separated in their minds in adjudicating the different
components of damage awards where one or the other of these objectives dominate may be to require a degree of analytical virtuosity
that the system cannot reasonably bear.
As will have become increasingly apparent, the two objectives cannot, in many respects, be reconciled within the framework of a single
legal instrument - in this case a civil liability regime. Pain and suffering damages may be justified for deterrence reasons but not for
insurance reasons. Collateral benefits perhaps should be deducted
from awards for insurance reasons, but not for deterrence reasons.
Punitive damages should not be awarded for insurance reasons, but
should, in some cases, be awarded for deterrence reasons. A single
legal instrument is incapable of resolving in any obvious and principled way these competing objectives. The increasing instability of
the United States tort system reflects a deep ambivalence about
which of these objectives should govern either in general or in partic137. See K. REDDEN, supra note 124, § 2.4. For an argument that judges alone
should decide the amount of a punitive damages award, see Sugarman, Serious Tort Law
Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795, 830 (1987).
138. Landes & Posner, A Positive Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 535, 563-66 (1985).
139. Id.

ular contexts. Short of a meta-choice on this fundamental issue of
the central predicate of the tort system, instability and uncertainty
will continue to pervade the system, as courts oscillate between the
two objectives in resolving both determinations of liability and quantifications of damage, resulting in correlative instability and uncertainty in associated private insurance markets.
Psychic Harm
An emerging potential head of damage, not sharply different from
pain and suffering, is that of psychic harm. For example, some DES
mothers have (so far unsuccessfully) claimed that emotional stress
induced by their concerns over their daughters' present or potential
health problems should be compensated even though the primary
victim is the child. 140 These claims are different from those for pain
and suffering damages where the claimant is the primary victim.
Again, the familiar tension arises. For deterrence reasons, it may
be important to confront the tortfeasor with these social costs, which
may well be real. However, the deterrence case for determining liability on the basis of strict liability or some extremely expansive theory of negligence that is tantamount to de facto strict liability is
difficult to sustain. For insurance reasons, it seems inappropriate to
allow recovery for this kind of loss. As a nonpecuniary loss, it is irrational to insure against because it cannot be mitigated by money,
and because moral hazard problems that render it extremely difficult
to verify the extent of the damage may make such insurance, if offered voluntarily on a first-party basis, so prohibitively expensive
that risk-bearers would prefer not to insure against it. Requiring tort
defendants to provide insurance to third parties for this form of loss,
as with pain and suffering damages, again confronts them and their
insurers with substantial uncertainty regarding the extent of their
exposure.
Workers' Compensation Benefits
The general position that obtains in most states in the United
States is that an employee's benefits are his exclusive remedy against
his employer, but the employee is free to sue third parties (for example, upstream manufacturers of products that have caused injury)
for full tort measures of damage. 141 In the event of recovery, the
employer has a lien on the recovery for workers' compensation benefits paid or payable and in some states the third-party tort defendant
140. See, e.g., Swiss v. Eli Lilly & Co., 559 F. Supp. 622 (D.R.I. 1983).
141. Epstein, Coordinationof Workers' Compensation Benefits with Tort Damage
Awards, 13 FORUM 464, 465 (1978) [hereinafter Epstein, Workers' Compensation
Benefits].
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may have a right of contribution or indemnity against the employer
in the event of the latter's negligence. 142 Some states limit a defendant's right to contribution or indemnity to the amount of the workers' compensation lien; others allow it up to the amount of the employee's judgment against the third party.' 43 In most states, an
employer 4insures
privately for his no-fault liabilities to his
4
employees.1
This system contrasts with that of many other common law jurisdictions, where either (1) employee actions against third parties for
accidents arising out of or in the course of his employment are totally foreclosed (as in Ontario) or (2) the employee must elect between workers' compensation benefits and tort recovery sometime
prior to determination of the latter.
A significant percentage of recent United States product liability
cases arise out of accidents or exposures in the workplace. Historically, such cases typically were confined to such instances as when a
manufacturer's defective machinery caused injury to an employee.
These cases have become much more prominent recently in the more
complicated context of mass toxic exposures, such as asbestos
exposure.
It is argued that allowing employees unqualified rights of action
against third parties without requiring subtraction of workers' compensation benefits from awards unnecessarily inflates awards and
therefore the associated third-party insurance premiums. 45 In addition, in the case of long-tail risks like asbestos, it is argued that allowing third-party claims exposes third-party defendants and their
46
insurers to high levels of uncertainty and problems of insurability.
The current system reflects the basic ambivalence between deterrence and insurance objectives that has been noted in other contexts.
Historically, workers' compensation schemes were designed to provide a basic level of insurance to injured workers. Recovery was not
contingent on proof of negligence by employers or fellow workers;
employees could supplement their coverage through first-party insurance.' 47 Deterrence objectives with respect to employers and employ142.

143.

Id.

Id. at 465.

144. See A.

LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §

92-93 (Desk ed. 1980).

145. O'Connell, An Immediate Solution to Some Products Liability Problems:
Workers' Compensation as a Sole Remedy for Employees, with an Employer's Remedy

Against Third Parties, 1976 INS. L.J. 683, 685.

146. Id. at 685.
147. See generally Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure of

ees are not central to these systems. In return for a no-fault or strict
liability basis for recovery, workers receive medical expenses and economic losses determined in accordance with pre-determined schedules. Nonpecuniary losses are not recoverable, other collateral benefits are not deductible (thus encouraging higher-income workers to
purchase their own market insurance for additional coverage), and
punitive damages obviously are not recoverable. To the extent that
deterrence objectives are accorded any weight in the system, this is
reflected in various experience-rating systems applied to classes of
employers. In general, this has not been a prominent feature of the
system, and promotion of work-place safety has been left, in part, to
the collective bargaining process and to an increasing extent to public occupational health and safety regulatory regimes.
The United States workers' compensation system, however, presumably in the interests of deterrence, has preserved an employee's
tort action against third-party defendants. 148 But as the liability of
third-party defendants in a product liability context increasingly
sounded in strict liability, presumably for social insurance reasons,
one insurance scheme has simply been layered on top of another.
The second scheme (between worker and third-party defendant), of
course, exhibits few of the features of the first in terms of limiting
recovery to heads of damage that workers voluntarily would want to
insure against; however, it yields a form of coverage for which they
are ultimately required to pay in the form of wage reductions. To
complete the circle of incoherence, third-party defendants (often
held strictly liable to workers, as in the asbestos cases, for social insurance reasons) are permitted to sue the worker's employer for contribution or indemnity (a cost of labor in addition to workers' compensation premiums) in the event of the latter's negligence,14
presumably to ensure that at the end of the chain the employer bears
some civil responsibility for the consequence of his negligence towards his employee. If this had been a major objective of the system,
why not simply have allowed the employee to sue the employer for
negligence in the first place and recover full (not scheduled) damages against him? Because, presumably, this would provide inadequate insurance to workers where the employer's negligence could
not be proved, but where the worker's financial needs were as acute
as in cases where negligence could be demonstrated. The nature of
the economic bargain between employers and employees embodied in
workers' compensation schemes seems clear: in return for making
the question of the negligence of an employer, fellow employees, and
Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REv. 775 (1982).
148. See Epstein, Workers' Compensation Benefits, supra note 141.
149. Id.
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an injured employee irrelevant, employees agreed to accept a lower
schedule of compensation
in the event of injury than the tort system
15 0
would provide.
The current United States workers' compensation system highlights the conceptual importance of separating the issues bearing on
the design of optimal insurance and optimal deterrence regimes. Any
single legal instrument cannot perform both objectives optimally and
trade-offs between the objectives are likely to be murky, unstable, or
incoherent.
In an analysis of the relationship between workers' compensation
benefits and tort damage awards, Epstein argued that the appropriate course of reform was to preserve workers' third-party claims, deduct from tort awards workers' compensation benefits paid or payable, abolish the employer's lien on workers' tort awards, and abolish
actions for indemnity or contribution by third parties against employers. He rejected the simple expedient of abolishing all thirdparty actions by injured workers as of "little merit" because of its
blanket protection of manufacturers and suppliers of defective products who would face attenuated incentives to improve the safety of
their products.151 However, in a later revisitation of the issues in the
context of the subsequent asbestos litigation, Epstein seems to be
open to this possibility: "One radical way to return to the compensation system is to bar all tort actions against suppliers. While this
may seem radical within the American system, it represents the uni'
form practice in every other industrialized country."152
If such a course were followed in the United States, the scale of
benefits provided would need to be reviewed to ensure that they reflected optimal basic insurance. Similarly, the tort system could no
longer be looked to for a deterrence function. Other instruments,
principally regulatory, would have to provide methods of deterring
employer and third-party manufacturer negligence. However, at that
point, we would have ceased to ask the tort system to perform the
impossible task of promoting socially optimal insurance and deterrence objectives simultaneously through a single instrument.

150. See Epstein, supra note 147, at 800-01.
151. Epstein, Workers' Compensation Benefits, supra note 141, at 470.
152. Epstein, Manville: The Bankruptcy of Product Liability Law, REGISTER 14,
46 (Sept./Oct. 1982).

RECENT TRENDS IN CANADIAN TORT LAW

This section attempts to highlight general trends in Canadian tort
law that suggest that its central impulses have become increasingly
congruent with those reflected in recent United States trends, despite
the formal differences in the two systems.
Determinations of Liability
Many judges, even within a negligence regime, are influenced by
the revised sequence of insurance to liability (rather than liability to
insurance) in making determinations of negligence. Mr. Justice Horace Krever, a prominent member of the Ontario Court of Appeal
and a former legal academic, recently told a University of Manitoba
audience that judges sometimes practice "intellectual dishonesty"
and make findings of negligence even if there was none because that
is the only way a plaintiff can be compensated. 5 3 Recent cases such
as the widely publicized trial court decision in McErlean v. Municipality of Brampton,1 " are often cited as exemplifying this proclivity.
In McErlean, a fourteen year old youth was gravely injured when
the trail bike he was riding slammed into another youth's trail bike
at high speed on a blind corner of a gravel road on undeveloped
parkland owned by the municipality. The municipality was found
mostly responsible for the accident for not taking better precautions
to safeguard an area that had such obvious attractions for youngsters. The youth was awarded $6.3 million. The decision recently has
been overturned by the Ontario Court of Appeal both on liability
and quantum.155 In another recent case, Biancale v. Petro-Lon Canada Limited, 56 Justice Henry of the Ontario Supreme Court described his approach to the product liability of a manufacturer as
follows:
In my opinion, the time has come to extend the policy of the law so that the
plaintiff is not obliged to prove negligence on the part of the defendant
which may be a difficult and costly burden to discharge; in such circumstances, negligence becomes virtually a presumption, if not a judicial
fiction.1117

Other recent cases in the products liability context also tend to
support the "Krever" hypothesis. With respect to manufacturers'
warning defects, recent Canadian negligence decisions appear to
153. Toronto Globe & Mail, Apr. 17, 1986, at B21; see generally Glasbeek &
Hasson, Fault - The Great Hoax, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN TORT LAW (L. Klar ed.
1977).
154. 32 C.C.L.T. 199 (1985); see the Slater Task Force's discussion of McErlean
in SLATER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 53-54.
155. Ont. Ct. App., Sept. 19, 1987 (unreported as of Oct. 21, 1987).
156. Ins. L. Rep. (CCH) %92,544 (Ont. 1986).
157. Id.
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liability
reach results similar to those reached in United58States strict
liability
of
holding
Beshada'
the
of
decisions (with the exception
there is
which
for
warnings,
of
for unknowable risks, in the absence
For example, in Lambert v.
no Canadian doctrinal counterpart).
59 a qualified engineer suffered perLastoplex Chemicals Company,1
was using in
sonal injuries when vapors from a liquid floor sealant he in an adjoinan enclosed room were ignited by a furnace pilot light
was
ing room. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the engineer of
entitled to recover damages for his injuries from the manufacturer
warning
the floor sealant. While the product contained a prominentnear open
that it was highly flammable and should not be used
explicit to alert
flames, the court held that this was not sufficiently remote as pilot
risk of ignition from sources as
the plaintiff to the
16 0
lights in furnaces.
LimIn another case, Buchan v. Ortho Pharmaceutical(Canada)
birth
of
ited,161 the Ontario Court of Appeal held the manufacturer
a result of
control pills liable to the plaintiff who suffered a stroke as
of a
blood-clotting, to which she was peculiarly susceptible because
warna
prior health condition. The fact that the product contained
establish
to
use
before
physicians
their
ing advising users to consult
inwhether there might be risks of side effects, and that physicians,
a government
cluding the plaintiff's physician, had been alerted by
held not to
was
involved,
risks
particular
information circular to the
warnings itdischarge the defendant's obligation to provide explicit of the pill to
self of the increased risk of strokes attendant with use the warning
either users or physician intermediaries. The fact that more extenattached to the product and the separate and somewhat physicians
sive warning disseminated by the defendant to prescribing
regulacomplied with the warning requirements under applicable
be irrelevant.
tions of the federal Food and Drug Act was held to 2
damages."
in
$600,000
over
The plaintiff was awarded
or sellers of
Recent cases involving the liability of manufacturers the scope of
defective products have taken a very restrictive view of
163
limitations of liability contained in express warranty undertakings.
191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
158. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. v. Canadian Gen. Elec. Co.,
Ltd.
Cominco
also
see
159. 1972 S.C.R. 569 (1972);
147 D.L.R.3d 279 (B.C. C.A. 1983).
160. Lambert, 1972 S.C.R. at 575.
1986).
161. 25 D.L.R.4th 658, 54 O.R.2d 92 (Ont. C.A. (1984).
162. 8 D.L.R. 4th 373, 411, 46 O.R.2d 113, 151 24 A.L.R. 441 (1930) (apply163. See, e.g., McNichol v. Dominion Motors Ltd.,
394).
ing Wallis, Son & Wells v. Pratt & Haynes, 1911 A.C.

Other cases often have held such limitations or
inoperative, often pursuant to the doctrine of fundamentalexclusions
breach,
leaving
a
manufacturer liable either for negligence, or de facto
strictly liable
on the basis of the core formal undertakings in the express
ties from which the limitations have been judicially excised. warran164 This
doctrine has even been applied to disclaimer clauses in
tween substantial commercial entities.10 5 The current contracts befundamental breach doctrine is highly confused, 66 and, scope of the
like
of the warning defect rules, is the source of a great deal the state
tainty as to when a product manufacturer has or has not of uncereffectively
shifted a risk by notice or contract.
A further area of uncertainty in the products liability
context is
whether manufacturers or remote suppliers of defective
products
are
liable to remote parties for "pure" economic loss, even
if
negligence
is proved. The complex, not to say obscure, decision of
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Rivtow Marinethe majority
Washington Iron Works 67 appears to recognize only a Limited v.
very limited
ambit of recovery for economic losses, while Justice Laskin,
as he
then was, would have countenanced more liberal recovery.
In
taking
this view, it is significant that Justice Laskin expressly
relied, in part,
on a social insurance rationale: "[Manufacturers] are
insure against such risks, and the cost of insurance, better able to
as
expense, can be spread with less pain among the buying a business
would be the case if an injured consumer or user was public than
saddled
the entire loss that befalls him."1 8 The similarity of language with
with
that of Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court
in
his
oftquoted statement in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Company,1 6 9 justifying the adoption of strict liability, is striking: "The
cost
jury and the loss of time or health may be an overwhelmingof an inmisfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the
risk
of
injury
can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed as
a
cost
of do'
'
ing business. 17o Whether in Canada manufacturers
or
suppliers
of
defective products will be liable to remote parties in
tort
for
pure
economic loss has been rendered even more uncertain
as a result of
164. See, e.g., Chabot v. Ford Motor Co., 138 D.L.R.3d
417, 39 O.R.2d 162 (Ont.
High Ct. of Justice 1983).
165. See, e.g., R.G. MacLean Ltd. v. Canadian Vickers
(Ont. C.A. 1970); Canso Chems. Ltd. v. Canadian Westinghouse Ltd., 15 D.L.R.3d 15
Co., 54 D.L.R.3d 517
(N.S. App. Div. 1974).
166. See, e.g., George Mitchell (Chesterhall) Ltd.
v. Finney Lock Seeds Ltd., 3
W.L.R. 1036 (C.A. 1982); Photo Production Ltd.
Securicor Transp. Ltd., App. Cas.
827 (1980); Beaufort Realties Inc. v. Chomedey v.Aluminum
Co., 116 D.L.R.3d 193
(1964).
167. 40 D.L.R.3d 530 (Can. 1973).
168. Id. at 552.
169. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).
170. Id. at 462, 150 P.2d at 440.
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of Lords in Junior
the recent decision of the majority of the House
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adopted and
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1
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Company
Veitchi
Books Limited v.
although
Rivtow,
in
dissent
Laskin's
Justice
of
extended the scope
72
retrenchment.1
judicial
some
suggest
decisions
yet more recent
In the transition to what may be a new judicial equilibrium, considerable uncertainty is likely to afflict insurance markets that are
attempting to predict and price socio-legal risk. Moreover, as noted
in the previous section, even if the transition from negligence to
strict liability is formally or explicitly acknowledged, strict liability
is itself an inherently unstable regime that cannot readily be kept
conceptually distinct from absolute liability. Indeed, to a greater extent than is often appreciated, a number of Canadian jurisdictions
have moved substantially toward explicit adoption of principles of
strict liability in the context of both products liability and environmental waste discharges. In General Motors Products of Canada
Limited v. Kravitz,17 3 the Supreme Court of Canada unanimously
held an automobile manufacturer strictly liable for "latent defects"
to the ultimate purchaser of the automobile under the Quebec Civil
Code, holding that General Motors' implied warranty against latent
defects in favor of the dealer ran with the car to subsequent purchasers. Both limitations on liability in the contract between the dealer
and the plaintiff and in General Motors' formal warranty were held
void. The reasoning and result in this case are strikingly similar to
that in the landmark decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,1 4 in which the principle of
nondisclaimable strict liability was espoused in similar circumstances. Whether the decision in Kravitz extends to personal injuries
(in Kravitz the plaintiff merely sought recovery of the purchase price
on account of the defects),' 75 and whether the Supreme Court of
Canada will take a similar view in cases arising in common law jurisdictions, remain continuing sources of debate and uncertainty.
Beyond these judicial developments, three provinces - Quebec,
Saskatchewan and New Brunswick - in recent years have adopted
by legislation the principle of nondisclaimable strict liability of man171. 1 App. Cas. 520 (Scot. 1983); see also Kamloops v. Nielsen, 2 S.C.R. 2, 10
D.L.R.4th 641 (1984).
172. See Feldthusen, Economic Loss: Where Are We Going After JuniorBooks?,
12 CAN. Bus. L.J. 241 (1987).

173.

1 S.C.R. 790, 93 D.L.R.3d 481 (1979).

174.
175.

161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
1 S.C.R. at 790, 93 D.L.R. at 481.

ufacturers of defective products sold for consumer uses. 176 The Ontario government introduced similar legislation into the provincial legislature in 1976,'177 pursuant to recommendations by the Ontario
Law Reform Commission favoring the adoption of strict products liability of manufacturers in consumer transactions. 78 The legislation
was abandoned, however, in the face of strong objections by local
manufacturers, and pending inter-provincial efforts to reach agreement on uniform consumer products liability legislation. More recently, the Ontario Law Reform Commission, in its 1979 Report on
Products Liability, recommended the adoption of nondisclaimable
strict products liability for all manufacturers of defective products
(not confined to consumer goods), other than for damage to property
used in the course of carrying on a business and for pure economic
loss. The Report contained a Draft Model Bill, upon which the government has not yet acted. 79
Outside the products liability context, Ontario recently has imposed strict liability for environmental waste discharges upon owners
of substances that pollute and upon persons in control of substances
that pollute.18 0 The so-called "Spills Bill" imposes wide-ranging
forms of strict liability on owners or controllers of toxic substances
for clean up and restoration costs, as well as for other property damage claims, bodily injury claims, and pure economic loss claims. 181
This controversial piece of legislation already has precipitated serious problems of insurability for toxic waste owners and carriers. The
analogies between it and the United States Superfund legislation will
be obvious.
In another report of the Ontario government's Law Reform Commission - its 1982 Report on Class Action Procedures - extensive
recommendations and a Draft Model Bill were proposed for substantially liberalizing class action procedures to permit the aggregation
of individual claims and to provide financial incentives for the bringing of such actions through contingent fee arrangements, hitherto
prohibited in civil litigation in Ontario.182 These proposals are
strongly influenced by United States experience with class actions,
176. See the Quebec Consumer Protection Act, QUE. REV. STAT. ch. P-40 (1977);
the Saskatchewan Consumer Products Warranties Act, SASK. STAT. ch. C-30 (1978); and
the New Brunswick Consumer Product Warranty and Liability Act, N.B. REV. STAT. ch.
C-18.1 (1978).
177. Ontario Consumer Product Warranties Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 87 (1980).
178. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON CONSUMER PRODUCT
WARRANTIES

(1972).

179. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1979).
180. Environmental Protection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 141, §§ 79-112 (1980)
(proclaimed in force Nov. 29, 1985); for commentary thereon, see S. MAKUCH, THE
SPILLS BILL: DUTIES, RIGHTS AND COMPENSATION (1986).
181. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 141, §§ 79-112 (1980).
182. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMM'N, REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS (1982).
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especially under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 3
If adopted, the proposed procedures presumably would have similar
impacts in facilitating mass tort or contract claims in areas such as
consumer and environmental protection in circumstances where often
it has not been feasible for aggrieved individuals to prosecute such
claims. A significant increase in the incidence of a variety of types of
claims should therefore be anticipated under such legislation. In
1982, Quebecadopted substantial amendments to its Code of Civil
Procedure to facilitate class actions, but rather than rely on enhanced private incentives such as contingent fees for bringing such
out of which the costs of bringing
actions, it set up a public fund
1 84
class actions can be financed.
Quantification of Damages

The contentious issues in quantification of damages in Ontario in
many respects track those that have proven problematic in the
United States (with the exception of punitive damages, which are
rarely awarded in tort claims in Canada), and much of the discussion of these issues in the previous section is apposite.
With respect to pain and suffering damages, three decisions of the
Supreme Court of Canada in 1978 - the so-called judicial trilogy
established a ceiling of $100,000 (inflation-indexed) for all pain
and suffering awards in personal injury actions. 85 As noted earlier,
restrictions on pain and suffering awards, even perhaps their complete elimination, can be justified on insurance grounds, although on
deterrence grounds tortfeasors should be confronted with the full social costs of their actions, in which case full pain and suffering damages should be retained.
Continuing ambivalence on this question, despite the Supreme
Court's holdings, is reflected in two recent developments. First, section 60 of the Ontario Family Law Reform Act of 1978, repealing
the Fatal Accidents Act, provides that a wide range of relatives of
the victim of an accident can recover not only pecuniary losses but
also damages for loss of "care, guidance and companionship," not
-

183.

FED. R. Civ. P. 23.

184.

QUE. CLASS ACTION RULES

L.Q., ch. 37, arts. 20-25 (1982); discussed by

Lauzon, Le Recours Collectif Quebecois: Description et Bilan, 9 CAN. Bus. L.J. 324
(1984).
185. Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd., 2 S.C.R. 229, 83 D.L.R.3d 452
(1978); Thornton v. School Dist. No. 57 (Prince George), 2 S.C.R. 267, 83 D.L.R.3d
480 (1978); Arnold v. Teno, 2 S.C.R. 287, 83 D.L.R.3d 609 (1978); see also Housecroft
v. Burnett, I All E.R. 332 (C.A. 1986).

only in fatal accident cases but also now in cases involving bodily
injury.186 This provision, now section 61 of the Family Law Act of
1986,187 has prompted a substantial increase in collateral claims in
personal injury and fatal accident litigation. In effect, the legislation
permits pain and suffering recoveries by persons other than the immediate victim of the accident. Whether the judicial trilogy applies
so as to impose ceilings on such claims is not clear. Reform proposals
perhaps would narrow the range of claimants and also would require
proof of a serious or permanent loss of guidance, care or companionship.188 Again, the familiar dilemma is posed by these proposals between optimal insurance and optimal deterrence.
The second development that has occurred since the judicial trilogy relates to the "grossing-up" of personal injury awards to ensure
that after the stream of income generated by investment of a lumpsum award is subjected to income tax, the remaining income will be
sufficient to provide the plaintiff with full compensation for his or her
injuries. The judicial trilogy, following earlier authority, appeared to
assume that tax factors should not be considered in damage assessments.189 Thus, foregone income would be estimated in gross (pretax) income terms, while the costs of care would be estimated directly, ignoring the fact that the income from a lump-sum award
would be subject to tax and would be less than that required to meet
these costs of care. Subsequent to the judicial trilogy, Ontario courts
began allowing plaintiffs to gross-up damage estimates for costs of
care to ensure that awards, net of taxes on income therefrom, would
be sufficient to meet these costs. As the Rea calculations noted earlier in this Article 9° reveal, increases in compensation for costs of
care seem largely to explain large increases in total awards in permanent disability cases.
From both insurance and deterrence perspectives the position
taken by Ontario courts seems correct. With respect to foregone income, a plaintiff is not liable to tax on the pecuniary loss component
of an award but instead will be required to pay tax on the future
income from the invested award." 1 The defendant should be required to meet the plaintiff's net pecuniary losses in full. Similar arguments apply to costs of care, with perhaps two reservations. First,
186. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 2 § 60 (1978).
187. ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 4 § 61 (1986).
188. See, e.g., Briefs by the Ins. Bureau of Canada and the Canadian Bar Association (Ontario Branch) to the Ontario Task Force on Insurance (1986) (on file with
author).
189. Andrews, 2 S.C.R. at 232, 83 D.L.R.3d at 454; Thornton, 2 S.C.R. at 28485, 83 D.L.R.3d at 491; Arnold, 2 S.C.R. at 325, 83 D.L.R.3d at 633.
190. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
191. See Arnold, 2 S.C.R. at 324, 83 D.L.R. 3d at 633 (award invested "will
generate income and that income will be subject to tax.").
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it is not clear whether the large awards now being made for costs of
care implicitly include a significant component of what would previously have been regarded as pain and suffering damages, but which
now has been subsumed into the scale of care that will be underwritten. Second, compensation for costs of care is not compensation for
loss of what otherwise would have been a taxable income stream (as
in the case of foregone earnings), so that in revenue terms, the case
for taxing income from an invested award does not seem nearly as
strong as taxing income from the pecuniary loss component of the
award. Unfortunately, proposals for the adoption of nontaxable
structured settlement schemes would treat both components of
awards similarly, in effect producing overcompensation of victims in
respect of their pecuniary losses, while appropriately compensating
them for costs of care. Amendments to the federal Income Tax
Act19 2 may be another reform option, although it would be difficult
to operationalize a distinction between the treatment of income from
awards that relate to foregone earnings and income from awards
that relate to costs of care in assessing a plaintiff's liability to tax on
a year-to-year basis in the future. In this event, perhaps some kind of
structured settlement scheme may represent the least imperfect of a
set of second-best solutions.
Another area of contention relates to pre-judgment interest. The
Judicature Amendment Act of 1977 provided for the awarding of
pre-judgment interest in civil litigation at relatively high rates of interest (in effect, prime rate plus one percent, running from notice of
claim until judgment). 193 Prejudgment interest now often forms a
significant component of larger awards. The apparent rationale for
this legislation (now sections 137-139 of the Courts of Justice Act
1984)194 was to encourage settlements by reducing incentives for defendants and their insurers to protract negotiations or proceedings
with a view to appropriating income from prospective payouts for as
long as possible.1 95 This seems a well-taken concern. Obviously, a
regime that provides for no or below-market interest prior to judgment creates incentives to procrastinate while increasing incentives
for plaintiffs to settle. Excessively high prejudgment interest rates
have the opposite effect: defendants will face strong incentives to settle while plaintiffs will have incentives to procrastinate. The appro192.
193.
194.

CAN. REV. STAT. ch. 148 (1952) (amended by ch. 63, 1970-71-72 Can. Stat.).
ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 51 (1977).
ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 11 (1984).

195.

C.

BRUCE, ASSESSMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES

211 (1984).

priate regime would seem to be one that is neutral in its impact on
the incentives of both parties to settle, that is, a regime that adopts
market interest rates, which approximately seems to be what the
current legal regime does. Thus, there seems to be no case for substantially reducing the current rate of interest. On the other hand,
proposals that prejudgment interest should not begin to run until the
plaintiff has not only given the defendant (or his insurers) notice of
claim, but also sufficient medical information to enable an initial assessment of the merits of the claim may have more merit. However,
defining with precision the evidentiary requirements that must be
met in this respect may be difficult, perhaps making the rule less
certain and more unpredictable in its operation than the current
rule.
A further quantification issue worth brief mention relates to the
discount rate applied to foregone future income streams in reducing
them to present value terms to determine the amount of a lump-sum
award. Several years ago a rule of court was adopted in Ontario fixing a discount rate of two and one half percent in all personal injury
cases, 196 reflecting historical evidence as to levels of real interest
rates over time. There would seem to be substantial advantages in a
system-wide rule of this kind in terms of reducing uncertainty and
rates of variance in awards. However, the insurance industry argues
that this discount rate is too low, and that even modestly higher discount rates would reduce significantly the size of larger awards. This
is, of course, true, but reducing the size of awards is not the end in
itself, one would hope, of the reform process. However, there is some
evidence of an upward shift in real interest rates in recent years, and
perhaps consideration should be given to reviewing the currently prescribed discount rate to reflect current best estimates of real rates of
interest.
The issues reviewed in this section indicate an increasing congruence between the Canadian and United States tort systems, especially with respect to determinations of liability, but also in some
respects to quantification of damages. Further, the substantial trade
flows between the two countries mean that in some areas, Canadian
firms or their United States subsidiaries trading in United States
markets are directly subject to the impact of the United States tort
system. Similar considerations apply to national suppliers trading in
Canadian provincial jurisdictions that have adopted strict liability
regimes. These considerations are particularly relevant in the products liability context, but may also be relevant, albeit to a lesser extent, in other areas, such as professional services and construction
and transportation activities. With prospects of further bilateral
196. Id. at 208.
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trade liberalization, further integration in the impact of the two tort
systems on economic activities in the two countries can be anticipated. In short, somewhat similar reactions of insurance and reinsurance markets to the tort systems in Canada and the United States,

as they currently present themselves, as they have recently evolved,
and in particular as they seem likely to evolve in the future, seem

largely justified. Insurance, by definition, entails pricing future risks,
and in this respect future socio-legal risk of changing currents in the
Canadian tort system that seem likely to parallel those already more
overtly influential in the United States tort system will manifest
themselves immediately in decisions on pricing and coverage.
Somewhat fragmentary evidence of more subdued symptoms of
the liability crisis in Canada may well accurately reflect the residual
differences between the two legal regimes."9 If general patterns re-

motely resembling these orders of magnitude can be corroborated
more systematically and continue to obtain, this decisively would refute contentions that insurance and reinsurance markets perversely
fail to distinguish Canadian and American tort systems. Such data
also suggest that it is the distinctive features of the two tort systems
as they presently exist and as they may evolve in the future that
primarily explain the particular complexion of the current liability
insurance crisis.

197. For example, Sean Mooney of the New York-based Insurance Information
Institute recently claimed that "commercial liability insurance premiums in Canada were
expected to experience increases in 1985 of 15% contrasted with 72% in the U.S. On a
per capita basis, commercial liability premiums are much lower in Canada than in the
U.S. In 1985, liability premiums (excluding auto) averaged $18 per capita in Canada
compared with $60 per capita in the U.S. The different legal system in Canada is the
most likely factor explaining this wide divergence in the cost of insurance." S. MOONEY,
THE EXECUTIVE LETTER 40 (1986). Time Magazine, in a recent cover story on the liability insurance crisis, claimed that a typical annual premium for an obstetrician in Los
Angeles is about $45,000 and for a neurosurgeon in Long Island, New York, about
$83,000. Church, Sorry, Your Policy Has Been Cancelled, TIME, Mar. 24, 1986, at 18.
These numbers should be compared with Appendix C to this paper on trends in medical
malpractice insurance premiums in Canada which, while showing rapid recent increases,
also reveal that no member of any medical specialty in Canada pays more than $5,000
per annum in premiums (and many medical practitioners pay much less). Sellers claims
in his recent study of Canadian medical malpractice insurance experience that the average malpractice award in Canada in 1984 was $90,000 compared to $338,463 in the
United States and that in 1984 one doctor in 30 in Canada was involved in liability
litigation compared to one in 12 in the United States. Sellers, supra note 51, at 2-3.
Time Magazine claims, astonishingly, that 73% of obstetricians and gynecologists in the
United States have been sued at least once. Church, supra note 197, at 20.

CONCLUSION

With the adoption of strict liability in the United States in the
early 1960s, initially in the products area and subsequently in other
areas such as toxic waste discharges, and with the broadening scope
of the domain of negligence, all principally premised on risk-spreading rationales, the United States tort system has become increasingly
incoherent and unpredictable, generating correlative uncertainties in
associated third-party insurance markets. Parallel, although less extensive trends towards the adoption of strict liability in product and
toxic waste contexts, and similar tendencies to relax the elements of
proof in negligence cases, have produced similar, although less severe, instabilities in Canadian insurance markets.
The social insurance rationale for civil liability is indefensible for
a variety of reasons. Most of the difficulties flow out of the impossibility of reconciling the social insurance and deterrence objectives of
the tort systems in any principled way. As courts oscillate in increasingly unpredictable ways between the relative weights attached to
these two objectives, uncertainty (socio-legal risk) afflicting associated private third-party insurance markets increasingly destabilizes
these markets. Insurance objectives would dictate substantially
smaller awards than at present, but deterrence objectives would dictate that tortfeasors be faced with the full social costs of their
wrongdoing. Insurance objectives also would make the quality of defendant's conduct irrelevant and would focus instead on his relative
risk-bearing or risk-spreading capacity. Deterrence objectives would
focus on the former consideration and ignore the latter. Strict liability, based on social insurance rationales, cannot be kept conceptually
distinct from absolute liability. But once this is acknowledged the
choice of insurer becomes arbitrary and unprincipled - any "deep
pocket" will do. Moreover, compensation or social insurance administered through the tort system - in large part because of the uncertainties involved - is appallingly inefficient and incomplete. Victims
receive only forty percent of monies entering the system, compared
to eighty or ninety percent under most forms of first-party or social
insurance. The costs of access to the system deter many meritorious
smaller claims while creating incentives to inflate other claims and
awards to overcome these costs.
Moreover, highly protracted delays often are entailed in receipt of
compensation - a recent sampling of personal injury claims files
concerning claims in excess of $50,000 undertaken for the author by
three major Ontario auto insurers disclosed an average period of
three years between notice of claim and settlement. 198 In addition, in
198. Data on file with the author.
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many contexts, such as strict products liability, the system is re~ressive in that low-income consumers pay the same implicit insurance
premiums as high-income consumers99 despite the fact that pecuniary
losses so insured differ enormously.' Finally, empirical studies suggest that a substantial percentage of accident victims receive no
compensation at all through the tort system. In a recent British
study, nearly ninety percent of accident victims surveyed (all with
relatively serious injuries) failed to benefit in any way from the tort
system.2 00 In Ontario, it has been estimated that only forty-five percent of those seriously injured on Ontario highways recover anything
through the tort system.201 As a system of social insurance or compensation, the current tort system is, on most criteria, an abject
failure.
A justification for the tort system as a system of compensation
that is different from the social insurance rationale often offered for
strict liability is grounded in Aristotelian and Kantian notions of corrective justice. Drawing on this body of moral philosophy, Ernest
Weinrib, for example, has argued that the internal structure of tort
law reflects a noninstrumental concept of corrective justice whereby
if one person injures another through morally culpable conduct (intentional harm or negligence), he has a moral and legal duty to reinstate the injured party to his pre-interaction state. Weinrib argues
that this theory justifies liability for intentional torts and negligence
but not strict liability, which would seek to impose liabilities on morally nonculpable individuals in the service of some broader social insurance objective.2 0 2 Even if this view of the tort system is persuasive, it leaves unaddressed the insurance needs of many injured
individuals who would not be compensated. As Weinrib acknowledges, these needs properly would require resolution by policy responses outside the tort system. In his view, these needs might indeed justify (on instrumental grounds?) the replacement of tort law
199. See Priest, supra note 13, at 1585-86.
INJURY 46
200. D. HARRIS, COMPENSATION AND SUPPORT FOR ILLNESS AND
(1984).
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(1973).
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LAW & PHIL. 37
202. See Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 681
(1983); Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, 14
with a correc(1985). Other tort theorists apparently regard strict liability as consistent
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by a comprehensive accident compensation scheme based on the
New Zealand model.203
With respect to the deterrence objective of the tort system,
the
judgment must be more qualified. In order to achieve an optimal
deterrence regime, damage awards must reflect the full social
costs
engendered by defendant's wrongdoing. For the victim, the object
of
the exercise ceases to be that of finding a "deep pocket" but
rather
identifying specific behavior which is deferrable, meaning behavior
which can be avoided or modified by defendants at lower cost
than
the cost to victims injured by it.
While much law and economics writing and other theorizing
recent decades has argued that strict liability may have more in
cient deterrence properties than negligence, 0 4 this view is now effiincreasing attack. Two major lines of argument have buttressedunder
this
view. The first is that the courts often will be unable to determine
with accuracy whether a given defendant could have avoided
an accident through precautions at a lower cost than expected accident
costs (the Learned Hand negligence test) and therefore by imposing
strict liability on the manufacturer of the product, the burden
weighing accident costs against avoidance costs will be imposed of
the best-placed decider - the party with superior information on
avoidance and accident costs relative both to the plaintiff and on
the
court.20 5 The defendant will then decide whether it is more efficient
to modify or withdraw the product or pay the damage awards.
While this argument, which revolves around relative decision
and
error costs, has some force to it, it suffers from substantial
indeterminacy. In replacing the least-cost avoider rule (the negligence
with the best-placed decider rule (strict liability), it is not rule)
clear
where the line might be drawn in any principled way. For example,
why not make all physicians strictly liable for medical procedures
that turn out negatively, on the grounds that a court is not
placed as the physician to determine whether the procedure as wellhave been handled differently or an alternative procedure, in should
retrospect, would have been more appropriate. Thus, a surgeon undertaking high-risk brain surgery that does not turn out as hoped would
be
strictly liable. The same reasoning could be extended to lawyers,
engineers, architects, accountants, truck, bus or taxi operators
deed almost any kind of professional or business defendant withor inany
claim to specialized expertise.
The second major argument that is commonly made to support
203.

Weinrib, The Insurance Justification and Private Law, supra
note 202, at
204. See generally Calabresi & Hirschoff, Towards a Test
for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE U. 1055 (1972).
205. See id.; Calabresi & Klevorick, supra note 67.
687.
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strict liability on deterrence grounds is that safety in many contexts
is a function of two factors - the level of care and the level of output.2 06 Care in designing, manufacturing, and marketing a product
will affect the incidence of accidents. Both negligence and strict liability regimes in theory equally well address the need for creating
incentives to take appropriate care. However, even if all cost-justified
care is taken, products will still, in a residual range of cases, cause
accidents. If these potential accident costs are unperceived by consumers, they will treat the nominal price of the product as the full
price, ignoring potential accident costs which should be viewed as an
additional implicit cost associated with purchasing and using the
product. Hence, to the extent that consumers underestimate the real
price of the product, they will demand inefficiently large quantities
of it and to the extent that accidents are correlated with the number
of units of a product sold, they will be subjected to an inefficiently
large number of accidents. Strict liability, by impounding these accident costs in the price of a product, will lead to an optimal level of
demand and hence output. A negligence regime will impose no liability for residual accidents once due care is demonstrated, and hence
will induce inefficiently high levels of output..
This argument is subject to two objections. The first objection is
empirical and challenges the proposition that consumers are systematically optimistic, and that they systematically underestimate the
probabilities or consequences of product failure. Various strands of
psychological and marketing data have been adduced to support this
objection.20 7 The second objection is more theoretical and general. It
argues an inherent indeterminacy in the case for internalizing accident costs through strict liability in order to influence levels of output, because it is not clear whose level of activities should be influenced. 108 Even in a simple two-party accident case, for example, the
206. Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
207. See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA L. REV. 1387

(1983); A. Schwartz, Products Liability Law (Law and Economics Workshop Paper,
Univ. of Toronto Law School, Dec. 10, 1986).
208.

This issue has been the subject of long-standing debate. See G. CALABRESI,
ch. 7 (1970); Blum & Kalven, Public Law Perspectives on a
Private Law Problem - Auto Compensation Plans, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 641 (1961);
Calabresi, Fault, Accident, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE L.J.
216 (1965); Blum & Kalven, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi- Auto Accidents and
General Deterrence 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 239 (1966); G. Priest, Internalizing Costs to
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Affect Activity Levels (unpublished manuscript on file with author, Jan. 10, 1986); Henderson, The Boundary Problems of Enterprise Liability, 41 MD. L.

REV.

659 (1982).

case of a consumer injured by a rotary lawnmower without negligence of either the consumer or lawnmower manufacturer, should we
internalize these residual accident costs to the manufacturer under
strict liability so as to reduce the number of lawnmower sales, or
internalize these costs to the consumer under a negligence regime so
as to induce him to use the lawnmower less frequently? Or to take a
United States case, Moran v. FabergeIncorporated,°9 where teenagers poured a bottle of flammable cologne over a lighted candle and
recovered against the cologne manufacturer under strict liability for
injuries sustained as a result, should we internalize the costs to the
cologne manufacturer, the candle manufacturer, or the teenagers,
given that the reduction of any one of the three inputs into the accident (or activities) would have reduced the likelihood of the accident? The Moran court, while acknowledging consumer misuse,
pointed out that the product equally may have presented hazards in
a normal use setting, such as a woman smoking a cigarette while
applying cosmetics. 210 However, in this case one might equally plausibly argue for internalizing the accident costs to the cosmetics manufacturer, the cigarette manufacturer, or the consumer. In each case,
incentives would be created to reduce one of the inputs into the accident. To take a slightly more complex case, suppose A, a drunken
driver, swerves into and collides with a car, causing B, the other
driver, in turn to careen into a lamppost. Assuming for the sake of
argument that A cannot be reached effectively in a tort cause of action (for example, he is dead or judgment-proof), should the accident
costs be internalized to the manufacturer or seller of A's car, the
manufacturer or seller of the alcohol, the manufacturer or seller of
B's car, or the manufacturer or seller or owner of the lamppost, or
B? Given that it is impossible simultaneously to internalize accident
costs to all activities contributing to an accident, Polinsky suggests
that the courts must decide whose activity it is "more important" to
control. 211 This might be taken to mean, in economic terms, that in
cases like the above, accident costs should be internalized to the activity whose level or supply is likely to be most responsive to cost
increases (price elastic). While perhaps correct in theory, this criterion seems hopelessly non-operational in all but the most extreme
examples. In the car accident example above, which activities are the
most price elastic? How would courts in particular cases go about
determining relative price elasticities of demand and supply for all
the activities that were necessary conditions for the occurrence of an
209. 332 A.2d 11 (Md. 1975).
210. Id. at 20.
211. A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 48 (1983). See
also Shavell, supra note 206.
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accident?
Both of the major arguments for strict liability on deterrence
grounds, like the argument for strict liability on social insurance
grounds, are afflicted with massive uncertainties. While Calabresi
has argued that these uncertainties could be reduced by developing a
detailed taxonomy of injury-causing situations, where judgments
could be made as to the appropriate liability rule by reference to
particular features of each category of situation,213 this seems a
dauntingly ambitious task and inevitably would seem to entail major
new sources of uncertainty in boundary demarcation and application
determinations, that is, the switch-points that trigger different liability rules.2
The argument for classical negligence liability on deterrence
grounds is somewhat more robust, although the predictability of the
negligence system should not be overstated. In many contexts, such
as products liability and professional malpractice, it is far from clear
that all-purpose courts possess a comparative advantage over other,
more specialized institutions in engaging in what is, in effect, public
standard setting.21 5 Indeed, we observe specialized agencies in both
the contexts cited charged squarely with this task. Apart from the
advantages of specialization, such agencies also are able to set prospective safety or performance standards in light of what now is
known about a product's safety characteristics or the health effects
of a medical procedure without at the same time assigning liability
for past actions which may not have been negligent. The tort system
necessarily operates both prospectively and retrospectively, but retrospective assignments of liability, if predicated on proof of negligence,
may not yield optimal prospective safety standards. Conversely, optimal prospective safety standards, if also applied retrospectively, may
generate severe problems of insurability with respect to what in the
past may have been unknowable risks. Again, a single legal instrument seems unlikely to perform simultaneously prospective standardsetting functions and retrospective assignments of liability in an opti212. See G. Priest, Internalizing Costs to Affect Activity Levels, supra note 208.
21 . See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 204; Calabresi & Klevorick, supra
note 67.
214. See Brown, supra note 71.
215. See Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 558, 559-91
(1985); Latin, Problem-Solving Behavior and Theories of Tort Liability, Can Lawyers
Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1985). Cf. comments
on Latin by Posner, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 747 (1985); Owen, Deterrence and Descent in
Tort, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 665 (1985); E. BELOBABA, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND PERSONAL
INJURY COMPENSATION IN CANADA ch. VI (1983).

mal way.
Similar tensions afflict current proposals to supplant or constrain
the tort system in particular contexts, such as medical malpractice,
with specialized arbitration systems or screening panels. If these systems are intended to declare appropriate standards of medical procedures for the future, then determination of these standards should be
independent of what might or might not have been regarded as negligent behavior in the past (with less advanced medical knowledge).
But if such determinations also are intended (as they are) to assign
liability for past events, then under a negligence regime what were in
the past reasonably attainable levels of competence should govern
(only deviations from these standards are likely to have been deferrable by the tort system). This is the basis of the argument for a
"state of the art" .defense and a defense of compliance with prevailing regulatory standards. In any event, either prospective performance standards are likely to be set too low or retrospective determinations of liability are likely to entail standards that were previously
unattainable. Uncertainty as to what the courts see as their primary
function obviously will translate into uncertainty in the pricing and
availability of insurance.
More generally, whether efficient enforcement of public standards
is achieved through multiple, individual, private lawsuits, with their
attendant costs, is far from clear. There often may be returns to
scale and specialization in public enforcement. In addition, unlike
the tort system, regulation often can be preemptive and does not depend on the occurrence of injuries and the attendant human waste
and suffering to trigger enforcement action. Thus, a priori it is unclear whether either in the formulation or enforcement of public
safety standards a strong case can be made for the negligence regime. However, it is acknowledged that this is an empirical question
that requires a comparative, empirical evaluation of the efficacy of
alternative regulatory strategies.2 16 The demonstrable weakness of
commitment in many self-governing professions to monitoring postentry competence with any rigor,21 and public regulatory failures,
arguably, in some of the toxic tort contexts,2 18 make generalizations
difficult. However, just as under-regulation is not socially optimal, so
too is excessively stringent regulation. A number of recent studies
have yielded disturbing findings on the consumer welfare losses from

216. Cf. Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
357 (1984).
217. See M. TREBILCOCK, C. TUOHY & A. WOLFSON, PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
ch. 11 (1979); REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS COMMITTEE ch. 9 (1980).
218. See, e.g., P. BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY
ON TRIAL (1985).
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overly restrictive safety regulations.
One might argue sensibly that category-by-category judgments of
the relative strengths and weaknesses of tort law and public regulation as deterrents are required. For example, at one end of the spectrum may be situations in which the tort system may play a useful
deterrence role such as the case of transient ride operators at seasonal amusement parks who are subject to relatively superficial municipal inspections. This is what Mr. Justice Allan Linden has referred to as the role of tort law as ombudsman. 220 At the other end
of the spectrum may be public regulation of highway safety; some
would argue that criminal sanctions for careless driving and other
public countermeasures are much more likely to influence traffic
safety than the tort system, so that adoption of a no-fault system of
compensation for auto accidents may sacrifice little in the way of
deterrence. However, even here it is important to point out that there
is substantial empirical debate about the efficacy of many public
countermeasures 221 and about the deterrent effects of the tort system. A recent detailed study by Gaudry estimates that an additional
one hundred persons have been killed per year on Quebec roads as a
result of Quebec's adoption of no-fault auto insurance in 1978.222
Gaudry attributes most of this effect to the fact that the Quebec
scheme (a publicly administered fund) charges all drivers a flat premium, irrespective of age, driving record, et cetera. Thus, young
drivers or drivers with bad driving records are able to buy insurance
and drive whereas under compulsory, private, third-party insurance
they may not be able to afford to buy the insurance that is a condi219. See, e.g., Peltzman, An Evaluation of Consumer Protection Legislation: The
1962 Drug Amendments, 81 J. POL. ECON. 1049 (1973); Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. ECON. 677 (1975); K. VIxcUsI, REGULATORY CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY (1984). For more favorable assessments of particular product
safety regulatory regimes, see Ronald Hirschorn, The Administration of the Hazardous
ProductsAct, in THE REGULATION OF QUALITY (D. Dewees ed. 1983); R. CRANDALL, H.
GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER, & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE AUTOMOBILE ch. 4 (1986).

220.

Linden, Tort Law as Ombudsman, 51 CAN. B. REV. 155 (1973).
See, e.g., J. ADAMS. RISK AND FREEDOM: THE RECORD OF ROAD SAFETY
REGULATION (1985).
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UN MODELE DE LA DEMANDE ROUTIERE DES ACCIDENTS

ET DE LEUR GRAVITE, APPLIQUE AU QUEBEC DE 1956 A 1982 (1985). For contrasting

findings on the safety consequences of United States no-fault systems, see Kochonowski
& Young, Deterrent Aspects of No-Fault Automobile Insurance: Some EmpiricalFindings, 52 J. RISK & INS. 269 (1985) (finding no safety effects at all and contradicting the
findings of Landes, Insurance, Liability and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical
Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents 25 J. L. & ECON. 49 (1982), and
Grayston, Deterrence in Automobile Liability Insurance - the Empirical Evidence, 40
INS. COUNS. J. 117 (1973)).

tion of the right to drive. While this feature of the scheme could be
changed, for example, by the adoption of a bonus-malus scale for
determining premiums by reference to traffic violations, as recom224
mended by the Slater Task Force 223 and as supported by Gaudry,
this simply would substitute the criminal courts for the civil courts in
making determinations of fault for insurance purposes. Fault would,
in effect, be reintroduced in another guise, and criminal courts may
become increasingly congested, as incentives to contest traffic offense
charges are greatly increased.
Between these two examples, there are situations, such as professional malpractice, where professional self-regulation may provide
partial or incomplete assurances of competence. Danzon reports that
a group of medical and legal experts found in a survey of hospital
cases in California that only a small fraction of cases of prima facie
medical negligence led to malpractice claims and that a vastly
smaller fraction (indeed a trivial fraction) attracted the attention of
the disciplinary mechanisms of the self-governing bodies of the profession. 225 For example, in California in 1976, there were 1500 paid
malpractice claims, but only six disciplinary actions for incompetence or gross negligence. 226 If self-governing professions are not
willing or able to regulate effectively the post-entry competence of
their members, then the tort system may have a role to play as
ombudsman in monitoring the monitors. That is to say, we should
not simply assume that all expansions of liability are bad by reference to some more austere, assumed "golden age." 227 Why medical
practitioners and hospitals are sued more frequently today than previously is a complex puzzle. Is it because they are more negligent
than their predecessors? This seems highly implausible. Is it because
patients in a more impersonal age are now more willing to sue negligent health care providers? Danzon finds that urbanization is an important variable in explaining variations in the incidence of malpractice claims.228 Is it because the tort system now increasingly
predicates liability not on fault but on capacity to insure or bear
risks? The burden of this paper has been to emphasize the third kind
of explanation for recent trends in the United States tort system, but
the second type of explanation also cannot be dismissed as a factor.
In reviewing proposals that currently seem to command wide support for reforming the tort system, I believe that the fundamental
223. SLATER TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 8, at 145-46.
224. M. GAUDRY, supra note 222.
225. P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 57, at 19-24.
226. P. Danzon, Paper Presented to the American Bar Ass'n Conference Fall
1986, at 13 (copy on file with the author).
227. Cf. Epstein, Products Liability as an Insurance Market, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
645 (1985).
228. P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 57, at 74-75.
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contradiction between social insurance and deterrence objectives
continues to be seriously obscured. For example, the U.S. Department of Justice Tort Policy Working Group has advanced a series of
proposals, many of which are designed to reduce the size of awards
by, for example, limiting pain and suffering damages, limiting punitive damages, and subtracting collateral benefits. 2 9 At the same
time, the Group has proposed that fault be restored as the general
basis of tort liability.2 30 The proposals to reduce awards can be justified from an insurance perspective - they represent overinsurance
that would not be observed in private first-party insurance markets
but the return to negligence principles can only be predicated on
the primacy of the deterrence objective (although it is to be noted
that the Group's proposals make no effort to render negligence principles more determinate than they have become). For this objective
to be optimally realized, tortfeasors must be confronted with the full
social costs of their negligent actions. This position also probably
would be supported by the corrective justice theory of tort law. If, on
the other hand, efficient insurance is the dominant objective of tort
law, it is not clear why fault is relevant. The proposals appear to
overlook the fact that the only general example of this kind of legislative curtailment of awards is workers' compensation legislation
where, in return for limited schedules of damages, workers have been
relieved of the necessity of proving fault. This kind of social contract
may well make sense on insurance grounds, but the Tort Policy
Working Group's proposals reflect no similar social contract. Efficient social insurance cannot be delivered by the tort system because
the system yields no coherent theory of how to identify the most efficient insurer. Given this incoherence, and the uncertainties that are
attendant on it, it is futile to attempt to reform the system with social insurance objectives as the operative criteria. 31 The closer we
come to realizing these objectives through the tort system (however
imperfectly), the further we will have moved away from attainment
of optimal deterrence objectives, which at least arguably can be advanced coherently through the system. There is a necessary inverse
relationship between the two sets of objectives.
The same contradiction in thinking but in reverse is evident in another recommendation of the Tort Policy Working Group - to elim229.
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REPORT,

supra note 5, at 61-74.

See Sugarman, supra note 215, at 591-603; E. BELOBABA, supra note 215, ch.

inate joint and several liability.232 In this case, the recommendation
may be justified on deterrence grounds - joint and several liability
may expose an individual tortfeasor to more than the social costs of
his particular actions, and in this sense over-deter him. But on insurance grounds, the effect of proportioning liability among many joint
tortfeasors may well, in many contexts, for example, toxic waste
sites, leave plaintiffs inadequately compensated (that is,
underinsured).
Similar confusion about the fundamental presuppositions of the
tort system is evident in the otherwise impressive work of Patricia
Danzon. She argues that the tort system cannot be justified plausibly
as a system of compensation or insurance (it is hopelessly inefficient), but can be justified only in deterrence terms, which she accepts as often being valid. However, having adopted a deterrence
predicate for the system, she then proposes that tort awards be drastically reduced (similar in substance to the Tort Policy Working
Group's proposals) and that statutes of limitation and repose be
amended so as to drastically reduce the time within which long-tail
risks can support a legal action.23 a Both sets of proposals are directly
antithetical to the deterrence objective she espouses, and can be justified only by with reference to the insurance objective that she
rejects.
This Article's premise is that the social insurance objectives
sought (mistakenly and at great expense) to be achieved by the current tort system need to be reassigned to the domain of social welfare policy, where gaps in present first-party and social insurance
programs can be identified empirically and policy responses devised.
Whether these responses might take a form as radical as the New
Zealand Accident Compensation scheme 234 cannot be determined
unless tort insurance issues are transmuted into social welfare policy
issues and investigated thoroughly in that framework. But this kind
of option cannot sensibly be foreclosed. In evaluating a New Zealand-style universal accident compensation option, two crucial design
issues stand out: first, from a social insurance perspective, can one
ethically defend a system that creates a "privileged" class of victims
of one source of misfortune (accidents) and treats victims of other
sources of misfortune (for example, illness, congenital disabilities, or
desertion) that generate similar income deficiencies much less generously? The extent of these inequities is largely a function of whether
an accident compensation scheme is conceived of primarily as an in232. DOJ REPORT, supra note 5, at 64.
233. Danzon, Tort Reform and the Role of Government in Private Insurance Markets, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1986); see also P. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE,
supra note 57, at 151-85.
234. Accident Compensation Act, 1972, no. 43, 1 N.Z. Stat. 521.
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come insurance scheme or much more modestly, as a minimum social security safety net. Second, from a deterrence perspective, can
one justify a scheme that eschews deterrence considerations altogether by imposing flat levies on motorists and employers, irrespective of accident experience or potential, as the New Zealand scheme

(like the Quebec no-fault auto scheme) does?
With respect to the deterrence function of tort law, further and
more systematic empirical research is urgently required into the incentive effects of the tort system in various accident contexts. Firmer
judgments are needed as to what deterrent benefits from tort law
would be sacrificed in each of these contexts if tort law were to be
displaced by more complete and efficient compensation schemes. In a
second-best world, these comparative judgments are rarely likely to
be easy. The complementary question of whether regimes of public
regulation or criminal liability can be designed or re-designed so as
to take up adequately the deterrence slack in currently contentious
areas of tort law such as products liability, environmental liability,
and professional malpractice liability, without creating or perpetuating the kinds of inefficiencies that afflict many current regulatory
efforts, must also constitute a central feature of any reevaluation of
the role of tort law.
If neither social insurance rationales generally, nor deterrence rationales (either generally or in particular contexts), are able to sustain the tort regime for personal injuries, then we are left only with
theories of corrective justice- to sustain the system. Whether such
theories are sufficiently robust to justify the enormous costs, delays,
and unredressed and undeterred human suffering entailed in either
the present or any more traditional tort system is a matter which
economics cannot answer. 35 Whether moral theory is impervious to
these costs and, if so, why, would be to launch another inquiry.

235.
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General Liability Bodily Injury
Approximate Age of Claim When Closed
2 YEARS OLD
YEAR OF
CLOSING

NO.

AVG.

274

3239

327

3043

294

3795

248

3631

288

3 YEARS OLD
NO.

AVG.

4 YEARS OLD
NO.

AVG.

5 YEARS OLD

2-5 YEARS

NO.

AVG.

NO.

71

17033

706

6974

4029

106

15729

725

7180

334

4937

80

13443

792

7469

337

6772

94

11252

742

8309

299

6162

98

22082

732

11886

343

7321

64

34766

731

16293

AVG.

Average Annual Change

Source: Derived from data made available to the author by one of Canada's major general liability insurers.

APPENDIX C
CMPA Fees
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